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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(j). On 
November 5, 2007, the Third District Court, Judge John Paul Kennedy presiding, signed 
a Revised Order Granting Summary Judgment, which disposed of all of Bodell 
Construction Company's ("Bodell Construction") claims against all remaining parties. 
That same day a docket entry was made by the District Court indicating that "Case 
Disposition is Judgment." (Addendum ("Add.") at 57.)1 Bodell Construction filed a 
timely notice of appeal on November 30, 2007. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
appeal to this Court in an order dated December 7, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that a settlement agreement 
between Bodell Construction and a non-party to the current lawsuit was an accord and 
satisfaction, as a matter of law, rather than a release. Standard of Review: If a trial court 
interprets a contract as a matter of law, as the District Court did in this case, the decision 
is reviewed for correctness, giving the trial court's interpretation no deference. Peterson 
v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^  14, 48 P.3d 918. 
2. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the same settlement 
agreement is unambiguous and not susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation. Standard of Review: A trial court's determination that an agreement is 
For the* Court's convenience, a copy of the District Court's electronic docket is included 
in the Addendum at pages 29-59. 
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unambiguous is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). 
3. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for 
Appellees despite genuine disputes of material fact regarding the intended meaning of the 
settlement agreement. Standard of Review: The grant of summary judgment is reviewed 
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Green River 
Canal v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, % 16, 84 P.3d 1134. In doing so, this Court must "view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable" to 
Appellant, the non-moving party. Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 
71,f 15, 10P.3d338. 
4. Whether the District Court erred when it ruled that the doctrine of accord 
and satisfaction bars Bodell Construction's tort claims against Appellees even though 
Appellees were not parties to the settlement agreement and are not referenced in the 
agreement. Standard of Review: The District Court's ruling regarding the scope of 
accord and satisfaction, which was derived from within the four comers of a settlement 
agreement, is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Peterson v. Sunrider 
Corp., 2002 UT 43, f 14, 48 P.3d 918. 
5. Whether the District Court erred in striking the Expert R.eport of Merrill 
Weight, Bodell Construction's damages expert. Standard of Review: The District 
Court's ruling regarding the interpretation of the governing Rules of Civil Procedure, in 
this case Rules 26 and 37, is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Pete v. 
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Youngblood, 2006 UT App. 303, lj 7, 141 P.3d 629, 632. The correctness of the remedy 
the Court imposed is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See id. 
STATEMENT OF PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
These issues were preserved for appeal because Bodell Construction opposed the 
Appellees' motions for summary judgment as well as Appellees' Motion to Exclude 
Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight. [R. 49-63, 2413-2535, 2744-2849, 3390-3403, 
3489-4029, 4038-4533] 
DETERMINATIVE OR CENTRALLY IMPORTANT 
PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The primary legal issue in this appeal is governed by the Liability Reform Act, 
U.C.A. § 78-27-42, which provides that "A release given by a person seeking recovery to 
one or more defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so 
provides." 
Rules 26 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-
1 are also centrally important to the issue of whether the District Court error in striking 
Appellant's damages expert. These rules are included in the Addendum at pages 14-28, 
60. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Plaintiff Bodell Construction filed the complaint in this matter on July 31, 
2003. [R. 1-20] The complaint named Appellees as defendants, along with Cherokee & 
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Walker Investment Company and Cherokee & Walker, L.L.C. [Id.] The case was 
initially assigned to Judge William Bohling. 
2. On October 29, 2003, Defendant/Appellee Bank One moved for summary 
judgment arguing that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction barred Bodell 
Construction's claims. [R. 34-36] Defendant/Appellee Mark Robbins joined the motion. 
[R. 309-310] 
3. On March 15, 2004, after full briefing and oral argument, Judge Bohling 
entered an order denying Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 316-20] In 
the order, Judge Bohling stated: 
The Court is persuaded that at issue is a liquidated debt for which less than 
the outstanding balance was accepted in the settlement agreement with the 
Jenson parties. Accordingly, no 'accord and satisfaction' was reached 
between Plaintiff Bodell on the one hand and the Jenson parties on the 
other. The Court is further not persuaded that an accord and satisfaction 
operates for the benefit of third parties unless said third parties are 
specifically referenced in the agreement. 
[R. 317] 
4. Following Judge Bohling's ruling, the parties engaged in lengthy and 
expensive discovery. During this discovery period, the case was reassigned to Judge 
Kennedy. 
5. Bodell Construction filed its First Amended Complaint on September 19, 
2006. [R. 2219-2242] The First Amended Complaint included clams for common law 
The Cherokee & Walker parties later settled the claims against them and are not parties 
to this appeal. 
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fraud against both Appellees, for civil conspiracy and unjust enrichment against Robbins, 
and for negligent misrepresentation against Bank One. (Id.) 
6. Following fact discovery, the parties engaged in expert discovery. On June 
11, 2007, nearly four months before the scheduled trial in this matter, Bodell 
Construction timely produced the expert report of Merrill Weight, which mathematically 
calculated different damage scenarios. All of the scenarios relied upon established Utah 
case law regarding potential damages and relied primarily on facts that had been 
exhaustively examined during fact discovery. Both Bank One and Robbins moved to 
strike the expert report because they claimed that the damages theories contained therein 
had not been adequately disclosed during fact discovery. [R. 2865-2873, 3365-3367] 
Judge Kennedy granted the motions and struck Mr. Weight's expert report in an order 
dated August 22, 2007. [R. 4766-4769] 
7. At the conclusion of discovery, Bank One and Robbins again moved for 
summary judgment. Among other arguments, Bank One and Robbins renewed their 
arguments regarding accord and satisfaction, asking Judge Kennedy to reconsider Judge 
Bohling's earlier ruling that accord and satisfaction did not bar Appellant's claims. [R. 
2589-2743; 3035-3222] 
8. At a hearing on September 10, 2007, just weeks before the trial of this 
matter was scheduled to begin, Judge Kennedy asked for briefing regarding the issue of 
whether the District Court had authority to revisit Judge Bohling's earlier ruling and, if it 
did, whether the court should do so. [R. 6256, pg. 61] Following briefing on this issue, 
Judge Kennedy reversed Judge Bohling's earlier ruling and granted summary judgment 
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against Appellant on the ground that accord and satisfaction barred all of Appellant's 
claims. [R. 6020-6025] 
9. On November 5, 2007, the District Court signed a Revised Order Granting 
Summary Judgment. [R. 6020-6025] That same day a docket entry was made by the 
District Court indicating that "Case Disposition is Judgment." (Add. 57.) Bodell 
Construction filed a timely notice of appeal on November 30, 2007. [R. 6226-6228] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
In early 2000, Appellee Mark Robbins ("Robbins") sold 50 percent of his bicycle 
operation to Cherokee & Walker ("C&W"), a private equity firm, in exchange for a $4.5 
million personal loan and a $500,000 capital contribution in the bicycle companies 
(collectively "Vtrax"). [R. 4058] However, the new business relationship was strained 
almost immediately because Robbins failed to provide information to C&W about the 
operation of Vtrax and made important business decisions without the knowledge or 
consent of C&W. [R. 4059, 4356-4360] Only weeks after entering into their joint 
venture, both C&W and Robbins wanted out. [R. 4060, 4363] By early May 2000, the 
parties had an agreement providing that Robbins would repurchase C&W's interest in 
Vtrax and repay the personal loan by making a total payment of $8 million. [R. 4367, 
4637-4643] However, Robbins did not have the $8 million that he had promised to pay 
C&W. [R. 4626-4629, 4645, 4647, 4649] Over the next several months, Robbins 
continuously missed payment deadline after payment deadline to C&W. [R. 3524-28] 
A more detailed statement of facts is included in Bodell Construction's Opposition to 
Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 4058-4095] 
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C&W became increasingly impatient and aggressive with Robbins in an attempt to 
recover its investment before Ytrax collapsed. [R. 4&2S] 
As C&W was attempting to negotiate a buyout, Vtrax was falling apart because it 
was dramatically under-capitalized and Robbins had high expenses due in part to paying 
inflated salaries. [R. 4651, 4039] Because of its financial condition, Vtrax was unable 
even to perform on any purchase orders it received for bicycles. [R. 4627] 
puring the same period, Robbins learned that Brunswick Corporation was 
auctioning its bicycle division, together with its popular "Mongoose" brand. [R. 4177] 
Robbins developed a plan to try to acquire Mongoose. [R. 4039-4040] He created a new 
"group" to pursue the acquisition of Mongoose without the "knowledge of C&W. [Id.] 
Robbins needed to maintain control of his bicycle company in order to be a legitimate 
candidate in the Mongoose auction. [R. 4382-4383] For this reason, he could not afford 
to have C&W seize control of his bicycle companies for failure of payment. [R. 4383] 
He also wanted to buyout C&W so that, in the unlikely event he was the successful 
bidder for Mongoose, he would not have to share the returns from his new acquisition. 
[R. 4040] 
By early August, C&W had retained attorneys and set in motion the legal process 
to seize control of Vtrax under the terms of the initial lending agreements. [R. 4658-
4659] Desperate to get $8 million to payoff C&W and get them out of the picture, 
Robbins approached Marc Jenson, who owned and operated a hard money lending 
business named MSF Properties. [R. 4204,4381] Robbins told Jenson about his need to 
raise $8 million to payoff his partners. [R. 4206-4208, 4381-4382] Robbins explained 
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that he was bidding for Mongoose and had already lined-up several sources for 
substantial, permanent lending. [R. 4391] Robbins also showed Jenson financial 
statements for Vtrax in support of representations that Vtrax had considerable value. [R. 
4385-88] 
Jenson ultimately agreed to lend Robbins $8 million for the buyout of C&W. [R. 
4381] Jenson planned from the beginning to fund the $8 million with $4 million he was 
receiving in an unrelated transaction and $4 million coming from Appellant, Bodell 
Construction. [R. 4392-4393, 4399] Jenson specifically told Robbins he planned to 
approach Mike Bodell, a significant owner of Bodell Construction, to obtain the other $4 
million. [R. 4393-4394] Jenson had a relationship with Mr. Bodell and had recently 
secured an unrelated $1 million loan from Bodell Construction for Jenson's hard money 
lending business. [R. 4395-4398] 
As discussed with Robbins, Jenson met with Mr. Bodell of Bodell Construction 
and solicited $4 million. [R. 4399, 4068] Jenson shared with Mr. Bodell all that Robbins 
had told Jenson, including the financial statements from Robbins. [R. 4400-4402] 
Jenson told Mr. Bodell the timing was critical and that the deal had to be done quickly to 
keep C&W from participating in the Mongoose acquisition. [R. 4323] Bodell 
Construction was still considering whether or not to make the loan when Jenson sent 
Robbins a commitment letter on August 9, 2000 for the $8 million loan. [R. 4660-4661] 
The letter called for funding the $8 million on or before August 15. [R. 4660] Robbins 
immediately notified C&W that he had funding in place to get them paid and said he 
would settle on August 15. [R. 4671] 
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Bodell Construction was undecided whether or not to make the loan to Jenson 
because of, among other things, the size of the loan. [R. 4330] Without a commitment 
from Bodell Construction, Jenson was unable to fund the $8 million loan to Robbins by 
August 15, and Robbins defaulted for the seventh time on a promised payment to C&W. 
[R. 4343-4347, 4677] With the pressure from C&W bearing down, Robbins approached 
Benjamin Lightner, his private banker at Bank One, and requested a letter representing 
that $165 million would be deposited into Bank One for Robbins and Jenson to manage. 
[R. 4071-4074, 4194-4195] A copy of this letter is included in the Addendum at 61. 
Robbins dictated for Lightner the information he needed in the letter. [R. 4213] Lightner 
and Bank One issued the letter requested by Robbins on August 22, 2000. [R. 4673] The 
letter contained numerous statements Robbins and Bank One knew to be false when they 
wrote the letter. [R. 4072, 4299] The letter also omits a number of facts that would be 
highly material to a party considering whether or not to make a loan based on the 
representations in the letter. [R. 4074, 4300] 
As planned, Robbins gave the letter to Jenson for the purpose of his showing it to 
Bodell Construction and convincing it that there was a confirmed source of repayment of 
the $4 million Robbins and Jenson needed from Bodell Construction for Robbins to 
payoff C&W. [R. 4407, 4409-4410] Jenson then showed the letter to Bodell 
Construction. [R. 4406] Based on the Bank One letter, Bodell Construction finally 
agreed to make the loan provided Jenson agree to a higher interest rate than Jenson had 
originally proposed. [R. 4336, 4403] 
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Eight days after Bank One issued the letter, Bodell Construction funded a $4 
million loan to Jenson, who in turn funded his $8 million loan to Robbins. [R. 4679-
4684] Robbins paid C&W and obtained full control of Vtrax. [R. 4686, 4688] However, 
Robbins' bid effort to acquire Mongoose, failed less than two months later. [R. 3506] 
Vtrax collapsed, having never sold a single bicycle, having generated not one dollar in 
revenue, and with hefty debts. [R. 4226-4227, 4081] Robbins defaulted on his 
repayment obligation to Jenson, and Jenson in turn defaulted on his repayment obligation 
to Bodell Construction. [R. 3052, 3521] Moreover, there was no $165 million 
investment/loan. [R. 3535] 
On March 18, 2003, Bodell Construction, Mike Bodell, MSF Properties, and Mark 
Jenson executed a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"). [Add. 01-03] 
The Settlement Agreement included a release of MSF Properties and Jenson that read, in 
part, as follows: 
2. Each of Bodell and BCC [Bodell Construction Company], for 
himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities claiming by, 
through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and 
forever discharges MSF, its affiliates and their respective members, 
managers, officers, employees and agents (each, including without 
limitation Jenson, an "MSF Party") from any and all claims, allegations of 
fraud, charges, demands, losses, damages, obligations, liabilities, 
grievances, causes of action, or suits at law and equity of whatsoever kind 
and nature, expenses, costs and attorney fees, whether known or unknown, 
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "Claim"), 
arising out of all past affiliations and transactions among Bodell, BCC and 
any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the Loans and all related 
arrangements and transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, acknowledges and agrees that the obligations of the MSF 
Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal and interest 
that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed 
fully satisfied and repaid in full; provided that such releases shall not 
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apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement to 
be performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof. 
5. Each of the parties hereto understand and agree that this is a mutual 
release of claims and that, following the execution of this document, no 
Bodell Party shall have any claim against an MSF Party and no MSF Party 
shall have any claim against a Bodell Party, except with respect MSF's 
requirement to pay BCC $3 million as set forth herein. 
(Emphasis added.) A copy of the Settlement Agreement is included in the addendum 
hereto at pages 01-03. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's ruling in this matter disregards the law of settlement in Utah and, 
if allowed, would upset settled expectations and understandings of numerous litigants. In 
1994, the Utah Legislature passed the Liability Reform Act, adopting a policy that only 
parties listed in a settlement agreement are released from liability. The District Court's 
contrary interpretation of the common-law doctrine of accord and satisfaction ignores this 
legislative pronouncement and, if allowed to stand, would muddle the doctrine of release 
and discourage settlement. 
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees and in 
making several predicate legal conclusions. Specifically, the District Court erred by 
finding that the Settlement Agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction on its face 
even though the agreement is repeatedly characterized as a release, the term "accord and 
satisfaction" is never used, and the agreement clearly states that it only applies to MSF 
properties and Jenson and is not intended to benefit Appellees. The District Court also 
erred in granting summary judgment and ignoring genuine issues of fact regarding the 
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appropriate interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. Appellant introduced evidence 
through deposition and affidavit indicating that Mr. Bodell did not intend to release any 
claims against Appellees, which created a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, 
summary judgment was inappropriate. Finally, the District Court erred by finding that an 
accord and satisfaction could benefit a non-party to the settlement agreement, who had no 
privity of interest with the parties, even though there is no indication that the parties 
intended to do so. This conclusion is contrary to Utah law, which requires a clear 
expression of intent to benefit a non-party to a release or an accord and satisfaction. 
In addition, the District Court also erred in striking the expert report of Appellant's 
damages expert, Merrill Weight on the ground that the damages theories had not been 
timely disclosed. However, the District Court's order was improper because Appellant 
did not violate any court order or Rule of Civil Procedure. And, even if Appellant did 
violate a rule, the error was harmless because the report was produced four months in 
advance of trial. The draconian sanction of striking the report was an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Erred in Holding that Bodell Construction's Tort Claims 
Against Non-Parties to the Settlement Agreement Are Barred, as a Matter of 
Law, by the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction 
Reversing Judge Bohling's original order, the District Court concluded that the 
Settlement Agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction that operates for the benefit 
of third parties, in this case Appellees, who are not parties to the Settlement Agreement, 
and are not even mentioned. See Revised Order Granting Summary Judgment at 3-4, 
Add. 08-12. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court relied exclusively on its 
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interpretation of the language of the Settlement Agreement itself, finding that "the 
existence of an accord and satisfaction is shown within the four corners of the Settlement 
Agreement." (Id.) Both conclusions are erroneous. The plain language of the Settlement 
Agreement clearly shows that the parties did not intend to create an accord and 
satisfaction or otherwise preclude tort claims against non-parties to the agreement. At the 
very least, there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding the intended meaning of 
the Settlement Agreement that preclude summary judgment. Moreover, even if the 
Settlement Agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction, there is simply no Utah 
authority that supports the notion that the accord and satisfaction would bar claims 
against non-parties to the agreement absent a clear intention to do so. To the contrary, 
the Liability Reform Act provides that parties who are not specifically named in a release 
do not benefit from it. The nebulous common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction 
should not be used to circumvent the clearly-stated intent of the legislature or the 
expectations of the parties. 
A. The District Court Erred in Ruling that an Accord and Satisfaction is 
Shown Within the Four Corners of the Settlement Agreement 
The District Court found that "the existence of an accord and satisfaction is shown 
with the cfour comers' of the Settlement Agreement." [ Id. at 3.] In fact, the text of the 
Settlement Agreement shows that the parties intended to create a release limited to the 
signatories to the agreement and did not intend to create an accord and satisfaction that 
would bar tort claims against non-parties to the agreement. 
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Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement contains the language upon which the 
District Court apparently relied in finding an accord and satisfaction. The relevant 
language provides: 
Each of Bodell and BCC [Bodell Construction Company], for himself, 
itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities claiming by, through or 
under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever 
discharges MSF, its affiliates and their respective members, managers, 
officers, employees and agents (each, including without limitation Jenson, 
an "MSF Party") from any and all claims, allegations of fraud, charges, 
demands, losses, damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of 
action, or suits at law and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, 
costs and attorney fees, whether known or unknown, suspected or 
unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "Claim"), arising out of all 
past affiliations and transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party, 
including, but not limited to, the Loans and all related arrangements and 
transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the foregoing, 
acknowledges and agrees that the obligations of the MSF Parties in 
connection with the Loans, including all principal and interest that may 
have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully 
satisfied and repaid in full; provided that such releases shall not apply to 
any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement to be 
performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof (Emphasis 
added.) 
Several provisions of the Settlement Agreement show that the parties did not 
intend to create an accord and satisfaction that would bar tort claims against non-parties 
to the agreement. First, the Settlement Agreement indicates that it only applies to the 
parties. Specifically, the fourth "WHEREAS clause" in the Settlement Agreement 
indicates that "the parties now desire to achieve a fxxll settlement of all obligations, 
disputes and other matters outstanding between them ..." (emphasis added.) [Add. 1] In 
subparagraph (a) of the release, the Settlement Agreement then defines its application 
only to MSF Parties, a terms that is defined to mean "MSF, its affiliates and their 
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respective members, managers, officers, employees, and agents (each, including without 
limitation Jenson, an "MSF Party")." In subparagraph (b), which Appellees contend 
creates an accord and satisfaction, the release is again limited to "the obligations of the 
MSF parties." The Settlement Agreement never mentions any parties other than the 
signatories to the agreement, and is entirely silent regarding both Bank One and Robbins, 
thereby excluding any possible intention to benefit non-parties to the agreement. 
Second, the Settlement Agreement explicitly applies to both "liquidated and 
unliquidated" claims. Utah law is clear that an accord and satisfaction only applies if the 
amount owing is unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. 
Raille, 998 P.2d 254, 259; 2000 Utah 4, U 20 (2000). Given that the Settlement 
Agreement applies to both liquidated and unliquidated claims, it cannot be an accord and 
satisfaction. 
Third, the Settlement Agreement characterizes both subparagraphs (a) and (b) as 
releases, and nowhere describes or suggests that subparagraph (b) as an accord and 
satisfaction. Subparagraph (a) indicates that it is a release of the MSF Parties, and 
Appellees have previously conceded as much. [R. 42] However, Appellees argued 
below that subparagraph (b) must be an accord and satisfaction because it would 
otherwise be redundant of subparagraph (a).5 [Id.] This argument completely ignores the 
4
 In any event, the amount owed was liquidated and there was no dispute over the 
amount due. The amount owing was simply a mathematical calculation of the principal 
plus accrued interest. The only question was Jenson's ability to pay. 
5
 This argument not only ignores the plain language of the Settlement Agreement, it also 
ignores the realities of legal practice. Attorneys often include release provisions in 
settlement agreements that are partially redundant in an effort to ensure that a client has 
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language that follows both subparagraph (a) and (b), which describes both provisions as 
releases. That language, in bold in the quote above, specifically provides that "such 
releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement to 
be performed or observed after the execution and delivery thereof." (Emphasis added) 
The fact that the Settlement Agreement uses the plural term "releases" instead of the 
singular term "release" shows that the drafters of the agreement considered both 
subparagraph (a) and (b) to be releases. Had the drafters intended that only subparagraph 
(a) constitute a release, they would have used the singular term "release." This 
interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the Settlement Agreement never uses the term 
accord and satisfaction. 
If this were not evidence enough that the drafters intended the Settlement 
Agreement to be a release, the parties added another paragraph to make it absolutely 
clear. Paragraph 5 of the Settlement Agreement provides: 
Each of the parties hereto understand and agree that this is a mutual release 
of claims and that, following execution of this document, no Bodell Party 
shall have a claim against an MSF Party and no MSF Party shall have a 
claim against a Bodell Party, except with respect [to] MSF's requirement to 
pay [Bodell Construction] $3 million as set forth herein. (Emphasis added) 
Because the Settlement Agreement is a release of the MSF Parties only and neither 
Bank One nor Robbins is mentioned in the a^eement, Utah law is clear that Appellees 
are not released. Appellees' claim that the language of the Settlement Agreement which 
released MSF and Jenson from further liability on the loans also releases them from 
as much protection as possible. 
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Bodell Construction's misrepresentation claims is governed by the Utah Liability Reform 
Act. That act provide, in relevant part: 
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not 
discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
U.C.A. § 78-27-42 (emphasis added).6 Thus, for Appellees to be released by the 
Settlement Agreement the agreement must explicitly provide as much, which it does not. 
In Child v. Newsome, 892 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court 
explained the purpose for the enactment of the Liability Reform Act as follows: 
Section 78-27-42 was enacted to repeal Section 15-4-4 of the Joint Obligations 
Act, which had codified the common law rule that a release of one tort-feasor also 
released all other tort-feasors. The statute was designed to retain the liability of 
tort-feasors and reverse the common law rule "so that release of one joint tort-
feasor did not automatically release all tort-feasors." (Citations Omitted) 
The Liability Reform Act requires that a release "must contain language either 
naming the defendant or identifying the defendant with some degree of specificity in 
order to discharge that defendant from liability." Child, 892 P.2d at 12. See also Nelson 
v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 935 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1997). 
For example, in Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339 (Utah 1996), the plaintiffs 
commenced suit against various persons and entities claimed to be liable for damage to 
the Salt Lake Athletic Club building. When the damage was originally discovered, the 
contractor who had allegedly caused the damage paid for limited repairs and received a 
release which discharged the contractor "and all persons and entities" from any liability 
6
 In turn, Utah Code Annotated, § 78-27-37(1), defines a defendant as "A person...who 
is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery." This definition 
covers both Appellees. 
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from damage to the building. The defendants claimed that because the release discharged 
"all persons and entities" they were released from any liability for the damage. The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the release did not cover the 
defendants, writing: 
In Child v. Newsome,.. .[\v]e found that the statute [78-27-42] was enacted to 
discard the common law rule that a release of one tort-feasor would release all 
tort-feasors and concluded that releases "must contain language either naming the 
defendant or identifying the defendant with some degree of specificity in order to 
discharge that defendant from liability." ... 
Holding that the ... [defendants] are discharged by the release would "direct[ly] 
oppos[e] ... the very statute that was enacted to prevent this from occurring." 
See also Thornock v. Jensen, 950 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that 
agreement releasing "heirs" did not name defendant with sufficient specificity to release 
her under statute). 
In this case, the Settlement Agreement's release of MSF and Jenson is completely 
silent regarding Robbins and Bank One. Thus, the release of MSF and Jenson from 
liability on the loans and any tort claims does not release Robbins or Bank One from 
liability for tort claims based on their actions in wrongfully inducing Bodell Construction 
to make the August 30 loan. 
Although Bodell Construction submits that the language of the Settlement 
Agreement makes it clear that the agreement only intended to release MSF, the burden is 
on Appellees to show a clear release of the claims against them in the Settlement 
Agreement. If one reasonable interpretation of the Settlement Agreement is that it 
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created a release for the benefit of MSF and Jenson but did not create release or an accord 
and satisfaction for Appellees', then the Settlement Agreement cannot be interpreted as a 
matter of law, the entry of summary judgment was improper, and the judgment must be 
reversed. See WebBankv. American General Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, \ 22, 54 
P.3d 1139, 1145 ("When ambiguity exists, the intent of the parties becomes a question of 
fact"). 
B. The District Court Erred in Finding That the Settlement Agreement is 
Unambiguous Because, at the Very Least, Genuine Disputes of 
Material Fact Exist Regarding the Intended Meaning of the Settlement 
Agreement 
At the very least, there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the 
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement that made the grant of summary judgment 
improper. Summary judgment may be granted only if the "pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The affidavits and 
depositions provided here clearly created a dispute of material fact regarding the meaning 
of the Settlement Agreement, and those disputed issues of material fact make the grant of 
summary judgment improper. 
Bodell Construction submitted the Affidavit of Michael Bodell in support of its 
opposition to Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment. That affidavit provided that 
"[i]n negotiating the settlement and signing the Settlement Agreement, Bodell 
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Construction did not intend to release any claims it had against Bank One." [R. 66] 
Mr. Bodell's testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the meaning and 
intent of the Settlement Agreement, especially when considered in conjunction with the 
plain language of the Settlement Agreement — which applies only to the MSF Parties, 
does not mention Bank One or Robbins, describes the relevant provisions as releases, and 
never uses the term "accord and satisfaction." Because a genuine issue of material fact 
existed regarding the intended meaning of the Settlement Agreement, the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment. 
C. The District Court Erred in Ruling that Accord and Satisfaction Bars 
Tort Claims Against Non-Parties to the Settlement Agreement 
Even if the Settlement Agreement was an accord and satisfaction, the accord and 
satisfaction would not bar tort claims against non-parties to the agreement because the 
parties to the Settlement Agreement did not intend that Appellees should benefit from the 
agreement. Bank One and Robbins may not seek protection under the Settlement 
Agreement without showing that intent. The Utah Supreme Court has discussed this 
requirement as follows: 
To effect an accord and satisfaction, payment must result from declarations of 
such a clear nature as to assure that the parties are aware of the extent and scope of 
such agreement. When two claims based on different types of transactions are 
involved, settlement of one does not result in an accord and satisfaction of the 
other claim without a clear expression of the parties evidencing such an intent. 
Messickv. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 (Utah 1980). 
7
 This testimony was reaffirmed by Mr. Bodell during his deposition. However, because 
the issue of accord and satisfaction had already been ruled upon by Judge Bohling before 
Mr. Bodell's deposition, that evidence was never entered into the record. 
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The Settlement Agreement does not show a "clear expression of the parties 
evidencing such an intent." Indeed, as discussed above, the Settlement Agreement does 
not mention either Robbins or Bank One or refer to them in any way. If the actual parties 
to the Settlement Agreement had truly intended to release all claims against Appellees, 
one would expect to see them mentioned. 
Absent a clear intent to release Appellees, Utah case law is clear that a non-party 
to the agreement cannot benefit from an accord and satisfaction. For example, in Killian 
v. Oberhansly, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether one partner's payment of 
partnership debts to a third party could constitute an accord and satisfaction of that 
partner's debts to the partnership itself. See 143 P.2d 1200, 1201 (Utah 1987). The 
Court found no accord and satisfaction as to the partnership debts, because it could find 
no evidence that the parties intended it to be so. See id. ("Nowhere in the record . . . is 
there any indication that an agreement to pay the partnership debts to third parties was 
intended to settle the accounts between the partners."). 
Similarly, in Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., the defendant claimed that an 
agreement to sell his truck to the plaintiff constituted an accord and satisfaction as to the 
defendant's other debts to the plaintiff. 615 P.2d at 1277-78. The Utah Supreme Court 
overturned the lower court's finding of an accord and satisfaction, reasoning that it could 
find no evidence that the parties intended their agreement to satisfy all claims against the 
defendant. Id. ("The record reveals no expression of an intent to discharge rights or 
obligations involving the lease and operation of the truck.") 
This focus on the parties' intentions is uniformly maintained by courts in other 
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jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., Fleet Mortg. Corp. v. Schuster, 811 P.2d 81, 82-83 (N.M. 
1991) (finding that plaintiff could not sue to enforce accord to which she was not a party 
or intended beneficiary); Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Indus., 257 N.W. 2d 804, 807-08 (Minn. 
1977) (denying third-parties' request to find that claims against them had been satisfied 
by plaintiffs settlement with one tortfeasor, by considering "the intention of the parties to 
the release agreement."); see also 1 Am. Jur. 2d Accord and Satisfaction § 11 ("if an 
injured party receives a part of damages from one co-tortfeasor, and receipt of that part is 
not understood to constitute a full satisfaction of the injury, the injured party does not 
thereby discharge the others from liability."). 
One test of whether the parties to an agreement intended an accord and satisfaction 
to release claims against a certain person is simply to inquire whether the person who 
claims to have been released was made a party to the agreement. See, e.g., Dillman v. 
Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980 (Utah 1983) (affirming lower court's ruling that agreement did 
not constitute accord and satisfaction in favor of obligor because obligor was not party to 
the agreement); Fleet Mortg. Corp., 811 P.2d at 82-83 (same). Applying that 
straightforward test here, there can be no doubt that Bodell and Jenson did not intend 
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their agreement to have any impact on Appellees' liability. 
A second test is suggested in Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 422 A.2d 16, 26 (Md. Ct. 
App. 1980). In Loh, a Maryland Court of Appeals conducted extensive analysis of the 
difference between an accord and satisfaction that applies to all obligors, and one which 
releases only the parties thereto. Construing a statute similar to Utah's Liability Reform 
Act, the Court concluded that where the plaintiff enters a release after obtaining 
judgment, that release applies to all co-tortfeasors, as liability is admitted by the 
defendants who execute such an agreement. On the other hand, a release entered prior to 
judgment, where no admission or presumption of liability is made, binds only those who 
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D. It Would Be Fundamentally Unfair to Dismiss Bodell Construction's 
Claims On the Basis of Accord and Satisfaction, an Ambiguous 
Common Law Concept that Was Arguably Supplanted by Statutory 
Law 
Accord and satisfaction is a common law doctrine that governs settlements. See 
Am. Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction § 1 (2005) ("An accord and satisfaction is a method 
of discharging a contract or a claim or a cause of action whereby the parties agree to give 
and accept something other than that which is due in settlement of the claim and to 
perform the agreement.") Release is a similar doctrine that, unlike accord and 
satisfaction, does not require consideration. The distinction between accord and 
satisfaction on the one hand and release on the other hand is not always clear and courts 
have not often been adequately rigorous in their consideration of the two doctrines. This 
may be due in part to the fact that the application of either doctrine will often produce the 
same result. 
Under the common law, "an accord and satisfaction between a person injured and 
one of several cotortfeasors responsible for the injury will discharge the other tortfeasors 
from further liability to the person injured." Am. Jur 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, § 11 
(2005).9 The Utah Liability Reform Act reversed the common law rule. See Child, 892 
P.2d at 11 (explaining that the purpose of this section of the Act was to reverse the 
common-law rule that a release of one tort-feasor also released all other tort-feasors). 
enter that agreement. See id. Under this analysis, the Settlement Agreement, which 
Bodell Construction entered with MSF Properties long before any judgment was rendered 
in this case, cannot benefit Robbins or Bank One. 
9
 However, even this general does not apply if, as in this case, receipt of partial payment 
"is not understood to constitute a full satisfaction of the injury." {Id.) 
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Indeed, given that the doctrines of release and of accord and satisfaction significantly 
overlap, the Liability Reform Act appears to have been intended to alter the common law 
rules relating to accord and satisfaction. The law encourages settlements and the 
Liability Reform Act was enacted to avoid the potential pitfalls in the doctrine of accord 
and satisfaction that would discourage settlement. It would be perverse and unfair to now 
allow Appellees to achieve the very result the legislature sought to avoid by enacting the 
Liability Reform Act. 
Since the Liability Reform Act was enacted in 1994, litigants have relied on it in 
settling claims. Given that the parties to the Settlement Agreement repeatedly 
characterized the agreement as a "mutual release/' it was reasonable for Bodell 
Construction to also conclude that U.C.A. § 78-27-42 eliminated the need for it to reserve 
expressly claims against parties such as Appellees. Given that the doctrines of release 
and accord and satisfaction have significant overlap, it would be unfair to upset the 
parties' expectations and apply an arcane common law rule that contravenes statutory law 
and that would allow Appellees to escape liability based on a settlement with a different 
defendant where they were not mentioned and where the amount obtained by Plaintiff 
was less than the claimed loss. 
II. The District Court Erred in Striking the Exoert Renort of Aooellant's 
Damages Expert 
On June 11, 2007, more than four months in advance of trial, Bodell Construction 
produced the expert report of Merrill Weight, Bodell Construction's Secretary and 
Treasurer (hereinafter referred to as the "Weight Report"), which calculated potential 
24 
damages in this matter. The Weight Report employed three different damages models: 
(1) benefit of the bargain damages, which applied the contractual rate of interest through 
October 22, 2007 (the first day of the scheduled trial); (2) a modified benefit-of-the-
bargain theory that applied the contractual rate of interest on the unpaid amount until 
October 3, 2000 (the expected term of the loan) and then applied a statutory rate through 
the date of trial; and (3) a comparable rate of return analysis that applied the interest rate 
that Bodell Construction would have earned on other loans that it could have made were 
it not fraudulently induced to make the loan to MSF Properties and Jenson.10 
Mr. Weight had already been deposed by Defendants during fact discovery and 
was available to be deposed a second time during the expert discovery period. 
Mr. Weight's report did not set forth some new, unexpected theories on damages^ To the 
contrary, it applied long-established theories that were well-known and are generally 
accepted for fraud claims. Rather than hire an expert of their own, Defendants moved to 
strike Mr. Weight's expert report claiming that Bodell Construction had not adequately 
disclosed these damages theories in its initial disclosures and discovery responses. Even 
though Defendants still had ample time to conduct discovery regarding these well-
established damages theories, and Bodell Construction committed to provide them with 
broad leeway in doing so, the District Court granted the motion to strike the Weight 
Report on the ground that "these claims and the bases for them were not disclosed during 
fact discovery and defendants are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those 
A copy of the Weight Report is included in the record at pages 2992-3018. 
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theories." (R. 4767) The District Court's order limited Appellant to the outstanding loan 
balance plus interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum. (Id.)11 
The District Court's order was improper and should be reversed for several 
reasons. First, Bodell Construction did not violate any court order and complied with the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, Bodell Construction's conduct - producing a 
detailed damages calculation based on generally accepted theories - is the manner in 
which most expert discovery is performed. Therefore, even if Bodell Construction 
violated Rule 26, there was good cause for the practice. Third, any failure was harmless. 
Given that more than four months remained before trial, the District Court should have 
imposed a less-draconian sanction and abused its discretion in excluding the Weight 
Report. 
A. The District Court's Ruling Should Be Reversed Because Bodell 
Construction Did Not Violate Any Court Order and Complied With 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law that this 
Court reviews for correctness. Pete, 2006 UT App. 303, ^  7, 141 P.3d 629, 632. It is 
axiomatic that no sanctions can be imposed on a party if the party did not violate a court 
order or an applicable rule. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(C) requires that a party make initial 
disclosures, including "a computation of any category of damages claimed by the 
disclosing party." Bodell Construction served initial disclosures that provided that 
A copy of the Court's order is included in the Addendum at pages 4-7. 
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"Bodell's damages constitute the funds advanced, together with interest at the 
legal rate, less the payment received from MSF. The precise calculations have not 
yet been completed. Bodell will make available for inspection [and] copying all 
discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which a computation is 
based." 
[R. 2895] This response complied with the requirements of Rule 26(a)(1)(C) and neither 
Appellee objected to this disclosure. 
Subsequently, during the fact discovery period, Bodell Construction provided 
discovery responses indicating that it was seeking interest "at the legal rate." [R. 2876-
78] In response to a specific request for admission from Bank One, Bodell then clarified 
that it interpreted the legal rate to mean "the rate provided in Utah Code §§ 15-1-1 and 
15-1-4." [R.2962] 
Section 15-1-1(1) is clear that "the parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any 
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is 
the subject of their contract." There is no dispute that the contract between Bodell 
Construction and MSF Properties was lawful. Therefore, Bodell Construction adequately 
disclosed that it intended to seek damages at the rate specified in the contract. 
Appellees apparently believe that the legal rate is the rate contained in Section 15-
1-1(2). However, Appellees did not ask and Bodell Construction did not specify that it 
intended to calculate damages using the 10 percent rate set forth in subsection (2). 
Moreover, even if subsection (2) applies, that section explicitly provides that a 10 percent 
rate applies "[u]nless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest...." 
That is exactly what happened here. MSF Properties and Bodell Construction agreed to a 
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different rate that would govern their relationship and should govern damages in this 
case. 
Because both subsections (1) and (2) of Section 15-1-1 provide that the legal rate 
may be the rate agreed to by the parties to a lawful contract, Bodell Construction's 
disclosure and discovery responses provided Appellees sufficient notice of Bodell Const 
Moreover, even if the responses were materially incomplete or incorrect, sanctions 
may only be imposed if the supplementation was not provided "seasonably." See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 26(e)(2). Bodell Construction provided the Weight Report in compliance with the 
District Court's scheduling order and more than four months in advance of trial. This 
production was seasonable under the circumstances. 
B. Even If Bodell Construction Did Not Properly Disclose Its Damages 
Theories, Any Error Was Harmless 
Even if Bodell Construction should have disclosed its theories more specifically, 
its failure to do so was harmless and did not prejudice Appellees. As mentioned above, 
Bodell Construction produced the Weight Report in a timely manner and in full 
compliance with the District Court's scheduling order. The Weight Report was produced 
more than four months in advance of trial. There were seven weeks of expert discovery 
left. The expert discovery period is the appropriate time to inquire regarding damage 
At a minimum, there was good cause for Bodell Construction's failure to disclose. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). Bodell Construction's approach to discovery was typical: It 
produced a report that included calculations made by a damages expert based on facts 
that were disclosed during the fact-discovery period. Cf. Tyson v. Amerigroup Illinois, 
Inc., 230 F.R.D. 538, 540-42, n.5 (N.D. 111. 2005) (denying motion to compel 
interrogatory response regarding damages theories before beginning of expert discovery 
period). 
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calculations and the factual bases for those opinions. Mr. Weight had already testified as 
a fact witness, was the person most knowledgeable regarding both the facts and 
calculations in his damages report. Moreover, Bodell Construction made it clear that it 
would allow Appellees to inquire into any factual issues relevant to the Weight Report 
during Mr. Weight's deposition. 
The legal theories and operative facts were also well known. Appellees' principal 
argument for excluding the Weight Report was that Bodell Construction should have 
identified that it intended to seek damages pursuant to the benefit of the bargain theory 
during fact discovery. However, the benefit of the bargain theory is just another name for 
obtaining contractual damages, which Bodell Construction disclosed as addressed above. 
The benefit of the bargain theory is a well-settled method for calculating damages 
on a fraud claim. In Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974), the Supreme 
Court stated: 
[T]he rule in this jurisdiction [is] that in an action for fraud and deceit the 
measure of damages is the difference between the actual value of what the 
party received and the value thereof if it had been as represented; this is the 
benefit of the bargain rule. Under this rule the defrauded party is 
compensated for the loss of his bargain and is not confined to his out-of-
the-pocket damages. 
(citing Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424 P.2d 136 (1967). See also Brown v. Richards, 840 
P.2d 143, 150-51 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The benefit of the bargain rule is intended to put 
the defrauded party in the position that he or she would have been in if the fraudulent 
representations had been true. 
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Moreover, the operative facts upon which Mr. Weight based his opinion were the 
subject of exhaustive discovery and largely undisputed. Those facts include: the date 
Bodell Construction made the loans, the amounts of those loans, the terms of the loans, 
and the defaults on the loans. The Utah law set forth above is well-settled and was 
available to all parties. In his expert report, Mr. Weight merely applied this established 
law to facts that were well-known. Therefore, any failure by Bodell Construction was 
harmless. 
Although trial courts have discretion to impose sanctions for violations of the 
rules, the District Court's decision to strike several of Bodell Construction's damages 
theories was an abuse of that discretion. First, as stated above, there was no violation of 
any court order or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, it was inappropriate 
to strike the Weight Report. Second, if there was a violation it did not justify the harsh 
sanction of striking the Weight Report, there was good cause for the failure and it was 
harmless. See Seymour v. Consolidated Freightways, 187 F.R.D. 541, 542 (S.D. Miss. 
1999) (refusing to exclude expert testimony for failure to properly and timely designate 
experts). Therefore, the Weight Report should not have been stricken. 
The one fact allegedly unknown to Defendants before the production of the Weight 
Report was that Bodell Construction had been forced to tap into a line of credit as a result 
of the defaults on the loans to MSF Properties and Jenson and had incurred interest that is 
recoverable as consequential damages. However, Bodell Construction made it clear that 
Mr. Weight could testify regarding this line of credit when he was deposed during the 
expert discovery period. [R. 3391-92] Therefore, this did not prejudice Appellees either. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the District Court's order granting summary judgment, rule as a matter of law that 
the Settlement Agreement constitutes a release as a matter of law and that it does not 
release any claims against Appellees, and reverse the District Court's order striking the 
Weight Report. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 2008. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
James S. Jardine ( J 
Matthew R. Lewis 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (tins "Agreement) is entered into this 18th day of March, 
2003, by and among BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah corporation O^CC"), MICHAEL 
BODELL, an individual ("Bodeir), MARC S. JENSON, en individual ("Jensen**), and MSF 
PROPERTIES, L.C., a Utah limited liability company (?MSF*). 
WHEREAS, in June and August of 2000, BCC made certain loans to MSF (the "Loans")] and 
WHEREAS, Jouson personally guaranteed the obligations of MSF underthe Loans; and 
WHEREAS, MSF has made partial payments against (he amounts outstanding under the Loans, 
but is currently in'default under the Loans; and 
WHEREAS, the parties now desire to achieve a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and 
other matters outstanding between them, including, but not limited to the Loans; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth above and the covenants and 
obligations set forth below, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of 
which art hereby acknowledged, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
1. Contemporaneous with the execution and delivery of this Agreement, MSF has caused 
$3,000,000 in immediately available funds to be delivered to BCC. BCC hereby acknowledges receipt of 
such funds. 
2. Each of BodelLand JBCC, for himself, itself their affiliates and for.all persons or entities 
claiming by, through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges 
MSF, its affiliates and their respective members, managers, officers, employees and agents (each, 
including without limitation Jenson, an "MSF Part/*) from any and all claims, allegations of fraud, 
charges, demands, losses; damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of action, or suits at law 
and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, costs and attorneys fees, whether known Or unknown, 
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or Unliquidated (each, a "Gain?1), arising out of all past affiliations 
and transactions among Bodell, BCC-and any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the Loans and all 
related arrangements and transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the foregoing, acknowledges 
and agrees that the obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal 
and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and 
repaid in full; provided that such releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in 
tins Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof, 
3. Each of Jenson and MSF, for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities 
claiming by, through or under biro, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges 
BCC, its affiliates and their respective officers, directors, employees and agents (each, including without 
limitation Bodell, a "Bodell Partf\ from any and all Claims arising out of all past affiliations and 
transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party including, but not limited to, tb<e Loans and all 
related arrangements and transactions; provided that such releases shall not apply T£ any obligation of 
BCC or Bodell set forth in this Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery 
hereof. 
4. Each of the parties hereto agrees that, except as necessary to enforce the provisions hereof^ it 
shall keep confidential the execution, terms and existence of this Agreement, the consideration exchanged 
herein, and all other matters ia connection with this Agreement; provided thai any party may (upon 
performance by the parties of the respective deliveries to be made hereunder) disclose that MSF, Jenson, 
Bodell and BCC have definitively settled all matters between them as of the date hereof and provided, 
further, that each party may disclose such items in confidence as appropriate to their respective tax advisors. 
Annm 
5. Each of the parties hereto understand and agree thai this is a mutual release of claims and 
that, following execution of this document, no Bodell Party shall have any claim against an MSF Party and 
no MSF Party shall have any claim against a Bodell Party, except with respect MSFs requirement to pay 
BCC 53 million as set forth herein. 
6. Tho parlies shall execute and deliver all documents, provide all information, and lake or 
forbear from all such action as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this Agreement. 
7. Each of BCC and MSF represents and warrants to the other parties hereto that (a) this 
Agreement has been duly approved by all necessary corporate or limited liability company action and tiiat 
the person executing this Agreement on its behalf has been duly authorized to do so and (b) they hava had 
opportunity to consult with logal counsel of their choosing in connection with entering into this Agreement 
X. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. Ibis Agreement 
shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties and their heirs, successors and assigns. 
In the event legal action is commenced by any party to enforce or inte/pret this Agreement, the prevailing 
party or parties in any such action shall be entitled to recover from the non-preyailing party or parties its 
or their reasonable attorney fees and costs. This Agreement shall be construed as though all parties had 
drafted jt This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding and agreement between the parties with 
respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior negotiations, representations, understandings, 
agreements or arrangements between them, whether written or oral, with rospect to the subject matter 
hereof. The parties agree that this Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts and, upon such 
execution, all the counterparts taken together shall constitute one and the same agreement Counterparts 
and signatures transmitted by iacsimOe^hall he valid.and effective as originals. 
t§) | p fp*. (KfY ££M*.*J B.CC \$> t^bb^-ifr T° 
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MSF Properties, L.C. 
David W. Tufts (8736) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
Jason R. Hull (11202) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
P.O. Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050 
(801)415-3000 
(801) 415-3500 fax 
Attorneys for defendant Mark H. Robbins 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; BANK 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF 
MERRILL WEIGHT 
Case No. 030917018 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
On July 27, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., the Court heard oral arguments on (1) Defendant Mark 
Robbins' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight; and (2) Defendant Mark 
Robbins' Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Defendant IPMorgan 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 2 2 2007 
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Chase Banlc, N.A., successor by merger to Bank One, N.A. ("Bank One") joined in both of these 
motions. Robert J. Shelby of Burbidge Mitchell & Gross appeared on behalf of Bodell 
Construction Company ("Bodell"). H. Douglas Owens of Holland & Hart LLP appeared on 
behalf of Banlc One. David W. Tufts and Jason R. Hull of Durham Jones & Pinegar PC appeared 
on behalf of Defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins"). Having reviewed the papers filed by the 
parties in support and opposition to these motions, and having heard the arguments of counsel,, 
and good cause appearing, the Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows: 
1. Motion to Exclude Weight. Robbins' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of 
Merrill Weight is GRANTED. Bodell will not be allowed to present testimony at trial to 
support those claims for damages that are advanced in the expert report of Merrill Weight 
relating to the Benefit of the Bargain theory, the Modified Benefit of the Bargain theory, the 
Reasonable Rate of Return theory, and claims for Consequential Damages. The Court holds that 
the defendants will suffer prejudice if Bodell were allowed to present these damages theories at 
trial because these claims and the bases for them were not disclosed during fact discovery and 
defendants are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those theories. Bodell has offered 
no legitimate excuse for not disclosing these theories prior to the close of fact discovery. Bodell 
will only be allowed to present evidence at trial on the one theory of damages that was 
previously disclosed, namely, that the damages are $4 million, less payments received, plus 
interest at the statutory rate. Bodell's ability to seek punitive damages, attorneys fees, and costs 
under this theory of damages for the alleged fraud was not considered by the Court in this motion 
and is therefore not precluded by this order. 
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The Court declines to reach the questions of the legal and factual viability of the 
various theories asserted by Mr. Weight. Those issues were briefed, but the Court finds that it is 
unnecessary to rule on those issues at this time in light of the Court's decision to exclude the 
testimony of Mr. Weight on the grounds described above. 
2. Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Robbins' 
Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines was asserted in the alternative 
and is moot because the Court has granted the Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill 
Weight. 
3. Other Issues. Bodell is permitted to provide a revised expert report from Merrill 
Weight on the damage theory that Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company is entitled to $4 
million, less payments received, plus interest at the statutory rate. Mr. Weight's revised expert 
report shall be served on the defendants not later than Friday, August 3, 2007. Thereafter, 
defendants shall have until August 31, 2007, to depose Mr. Weight and to serve rebuttal reports 
to Mr. Weight's revised expert report. Bodell shall have until September 14, 2007, to depose this 
expert designated by the defendants. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: August ^ 2 0 0 7 . 
Approved as to form 
JudgeJQJhn raul Kennpdy 
Thijdfoistrict Court 
\ 
Robert J. Shelby 
Burbidge & MitHSell 
A. Beckstead 
[. Douglas Owens 
e* 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Co. Holland & Hart 
Attorneys for Defendant Bank One, N.A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on tins AJ day of August, 2007,1 caused a copy of the within and 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT to be delivered via hand delivery to the following: 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Robert Shelby 
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John A. Beckstead 
H. Douglas Owens 
Romaine C. Marshall 
Holland & Hart LLP 
60 E. South temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031 
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John A. Beckstead, #0263 
H. Douglas Owens, #7762 
Romaine C. Marshall, #9654 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031 
Telephone: (801) 799-5800 
Fax: (801)799-5700 
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
as successor to Bank One, N.A. 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE & WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company; BANK ONE, 
UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, and DOES 1 
through 50, 
Defendant 
REVISED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030917018 
Hon. John Paul Kennedy 
The following Motions for Summary Judgment were filed in this action: 
1. Motion of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. for Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud 
Claim dated November 29, 2006 (the "Fraud Summary Judgment Motion"). 
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2. Mark Robbins Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 29, 2007 (the 
"Robbins Motion"). 
3. Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Fraud and Negligent 
Misrepresentation Claims dated July 2, 2007 (the "Bank One Motion"). 
4. Joinder in Defendant Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs 
Fraud Claims dated July 9, 2007 (the "Robbins Joinder"). 
Hearing on the Fraud Summary Judgment Motion was held before this Court on April 6, 
2007 and the Motion was taken under advisement. 
Hearing on the Bank One Motion and the Robbins Motion was held before this Court on 
September 10, 2007. At that time, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental memoranda 
on the issue of the Court's authority to reconsider the order previously entered by Judge William 
Bohling and scheduled further oral argument. 
The further oral argument was held October 3, 2007. Appearing at that argument were 
James Jardine and Matthew Lewis of Ray Quinney & Nebeker on behalf of Bodell Construction 
Company ("Bodell"), John A. Beckstead and Douglas Owens of Holland & Hart on behalf of 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Bank One, N.A. ("Bank One"), and David 
W. Tufts and Jason R. Hull of Durham Jones & Pinegar and Andrew Deiss of Jones Waldo 
Holbrook & McDonough on behalf of Defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins"). 
Having reviewed the Memoranda and Exhibits filed by the parties in support of and in 
opposition to these Motions, and having heard the arguments of counsel, and good cause 
appearing, the Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows: 
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1. The Court finds that it has authority to reconsider an earlier order of the Court 
where there is a basis to believe the earlier order is in error and final judgment has not been 
entered. The Court finds that the Order dated March 15, 2004 entered by the Hon. William 
Bohling is in error and it is therefore proper for this Court to reconsider the accord and 
satisfaction arguments which were the subject of the March 15, 2004 Order. 
2. The Bank One Motion is hereby granted. The ground upon which the Bank One 
Motion is granted is that the Settlement Agreement dated March 18, 2003, between Bodell 
Constmction Company, Michael Bodell, MSF Properties, LC, and Marc S. Jenson (the 
"Settlement Agreement") constitutes an accord and satisfaction and the Court makes the 
following findings, together with findings stated in the record: 
a. The Settlement Agreement is unambiguous and clear. 
b. The Settlement Agreement includes the settlement of liquidated and 
unliquidated claims. 
c. The Settlement Agreement was drafted by lawyers and the parties are 
sophisticated businessmen. 
d. The Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction. 
e. The existence of an accord and satisfaction is shown within the "four 
corners" of the Settlement Agreement. 
f. An accord and satisfaction operates for the benefit of third parties and 




misrepresentation asserted against Bank One and the claims for fraud, civil conspiracy, and 
unjust enrichment asserted against Robbins. 
3. The Court finds that Robbins has properly joined in the Bank One Motion. All of 
the bases for granting the Bank One Motion with respect to the claims asserted against Bank One 
apply to the claims asserted against Robbins. 
4. The Court declines to rule on the other arguments in the Bank One Motion, in the 
Robbins Motion, and in the Fraud Summary Judgment Motion. 
5. The trial date of October 22, 2007, and all other dates and deadlines set by the 
Court are hereby vacated. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: November J> , 2007. 
Approved as to form: 
5. Jarcftuae JjfefesS. 
fatthew R. Lewis 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, P.C. 




David W\ Tuns 
Jason R. Hull 
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark H. Robbins 
John A. 
H. Douglas Owens 
Romaine C. Marshall 
Holland & Hart LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, 2007,1 served a copy of the foregoing document to the 
following by: 
James S. Jardine 
Matthew L. Lewis 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 S. State Street #1400 
P. O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
David W. Tufts 
Jason R. Hull 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
P. O. Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050 
James S. Lowhe 
Andrew G. Deiss 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision 
(a)(2) and except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party 
shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number 
of each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its 
claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the 
subjects of the information; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all 
discoverable documents, data compilations, electronically stored 
information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control 
of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment; 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the 
disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as under 
Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on 
which such computation is based, including materials bearing on the 
nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance 
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business 
may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered 
in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy 
the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 
days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). Unless 
otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party 
joined after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures 
within 30 days after being served. A party shall make initial disclosures 
based on the information then reasonably available and is not excused 
from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the 
investigation of the case or because the party challenges the 
sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another party has 
not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do 
not apply to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the 
pleadings is $20,000 or less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule 
making proceedings of an administrative agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforcbbbe an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, 
Chapter 4; and 
(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is 
not represented by counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under 
subpart (a)(1) are subject to discovery under subpart (b). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any 
person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 
703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or 
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose 
duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert 
testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by 
the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on 
which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and 
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the 
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a 
list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten 
years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a 
listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made 
within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by 
subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or 
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rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party 
under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 days after the disclosure made by 
the other party. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the 
following information regarding the evidence that it may present at 
trial other than solely for impeachment: 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and 
telephone number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses 
the party expects to present and witnesses the party may call if the 
need arises; 
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to 
be presented by means of a deposition and, if not taken 
stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of the 
deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other 
exhibit, including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying 
those which the party expects to offer and those which the party may 
offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 
days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is 
specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) 
any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated 
by another party under subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, 
together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to the 
admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). 
Objections not so disclosed, other than objections under Rules 402 and 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless 
excused by the court for good cause shown. 
(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties 
or ordered by the court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and 
(4) shall be made in writing, signed and served. 
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain 
discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon 
oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; 
production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or 
other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental 
examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of 
the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as 
follows: 
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and 
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable 
matter. I t is not ground for objection that the information sought will 
be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored 
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost. The party shall expressly 
make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible, 
describing the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature 
of the information not provided, and any other information that will 
enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel 
discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is 
sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court 
may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows 
good cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court 
may specify conditions for the discovery. 
(b)(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery 
methods set forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if 
it determines that: 
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or 
(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking 
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues 
at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative 
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of 
Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of 
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under 
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation 
or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's 
representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, surety, 
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a snowing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the 
preparation of the case and that the party is unable without undue 
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other 
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required 
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of 
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an 
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement 
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that 
party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the 
required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject 
matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the 
person may move for a court order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) 
apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For 
purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a 
written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the 
person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or 
other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially 
verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and 
contemporaneously recorded. 
(b)(5) Trial preparation: Experts. 
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as 
an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is 
required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall be 
conducted within 60 days after the report is provided. 
(b)(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an 
expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party 
in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not 
expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 
35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is 
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or 
opinions on the same subject by other means. 
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery 
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule; and 
(b)(5)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision 
(b)(5)(A) of this rule the court may require, and with respect to 
discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this rule the court 
shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair 
portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter 
party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert. 
(b)(6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. 
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information 
otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is 
privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the 
party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of 
the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed 
in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or 
protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the 
privilege or protection. 
(b)(6)(B) Information produced. If information is produced in 
discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-
preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party 
that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After 
being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the 
specified information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose 
the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may 
promptly present the information to the court under seal for a 
determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the 
information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to 
retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information until 
the claim is resolved. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from 
whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the 
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other 
affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, 
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or 
alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including 
one or more of the following: 
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and 
conditions, including a designation of the time or place; 
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery 
other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of 
the discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of 
the court; 
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, 
or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a 
designated way; 
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or 
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by 
the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the 
court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any 
party or person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 
37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under 
subdivision (a)(2), except as authorized under these rules, or unless 
otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party 
may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have met 
and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise 
stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, fact discovery shall 
be completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed. Unless the 
court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in 
the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be 
used in any sequence and the fact that a party is conducting 
discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to 
delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure 
under subdivision (a) or responded to a request for discovery with a 
response is under a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to 
include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in 
the following circumstances: 
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals 
disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some 
material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect 
and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been 
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in 
writing. With respect to testimony of an expert from whom a report is 
required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty extends both to 
information contained in the report and to information provided 
through a deposition of the expert. 
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to 
an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission if 
the party learns that the response is in some material respect 
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information 
has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the 
uiscovery process or in writing. 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), 
except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order. 
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of 
the action, meet in person or by telephone to discuss the nature and 
basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for 
settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures 
required by subdivision (a)(1), to discuss any issues relating to 
preserving discoverable information and to develop a stipulated 
discovery plan. Plaintiff's counsel shall schedule the meeting. The 
attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt 
in good faith to agree upon the discovery plan. 
(f)(2) The plan shall include: 
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or 
requirement for disclosures under subdivision (a), including a 
statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made 
or will be made; 
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when 
discovery should be completed, whether discovery should be 
conducted in phases and whether discovery should be limited to 
particular issues; 
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of 
electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which 
it should be produced; 
(f)(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as 
trial-preparation material, including - if the parties agree on a 
procedure to assert such claims after production - whether to ask the 
court to include their agreement in an order; 
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery 
imposed under these rules, and what other limitations should be 
imposed; 
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal 
basis for allocating fault to a non-party and the identity of the non-
party; and 
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court. 
(f)(3) Plaintiff's counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after 
the meeting and in any event no more than 60 days after the first 
answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity with the parties' 
stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also 
include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(l)-(6), except that the 
date or dates for pretrial conferences, final pretrial conference and trial 
shall be scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the close of 
discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a 
discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party 
may move the court for entry of a discovery order on any topic on 
which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the 
court, the presumptions established by these rules shall govern any 
subject not included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan. 
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management 
conference or order under Rule 16(b). 
(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the 
stipulated discovery plan and discovery order, unless the court orders 
on stipulation or motion a modification of the discovery plan and order. 
The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after 
joinder. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every 
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party 
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record or by the party if the 
party is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The signature 
of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has 
read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of the 
person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly 
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery 
already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, 
response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is 
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the 
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be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion 
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the 
certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or 
objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include 
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an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an 
action or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any 
person within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same 
conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending 
in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of 
the taking of such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of 
the county in which the person whose deposition is to be taken resides 
or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising during 
the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be 
submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court in the county 
where the deposition is being taken. 
(i) Filing. 
( i ) ( l ) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file 
disclosures or requests for discovery with the court, but shall file only 
the original certificate of service stating that the disclosures or 
requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the 
date of service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall 
not file a response to a request for discovery with the court, but shall 
file only the original certificate of service stating that the response has 
been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as 
provided in Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the 
court, depositions shall not be filed with the court. 
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under 
Rule 37(a) shall attach to the motion a copy of the request for 
discovery or the response which is at issue. 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for 
an order compelling discovery as follows: 
(a)(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be 
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters 
relating to a deposition, to the court in the district where the 
deposition is being taken. An application for an order to a deponent 
who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district where the 
deposition is being taken. 
(a)(2) Motion. 
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), 
any other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate 
sanctions. The motion must include a certification that the movant has 
in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not 
making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without 
court action. 
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31 , or a corporation or other entity fails to 
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to 
answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to 
respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to 
permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an 
order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling 
inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted 
to confer with the person or party failing to make the discovery in an 
effort to secure the information or material without court action. When 
taking a deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question 
may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for an 
order. 
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For 
purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete disclosure, 
answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or 
respond. 
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions. 
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(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested 
discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the court shall, after 
opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct 
necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct 
or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses 
incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the motion was filed without the movant's first making 
a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court 
action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or 
objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make 
an award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective 
order authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after opportunity for 
hearing, require the moving party or the attorney or both of them to 
pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable 
expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, 
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court 
may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, 
after opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a 
just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(b)(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed 
to do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being 
taken, the failure may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to 
obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, 
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under 
Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, , unless the court finds that the 
failure was substantially justified, the court in which the action is 
pending may take such action in regard to the failure as are just, 
including the following: 
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(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be 
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim 
of the party obtaining the order; 
(b)(2)(B)prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing 
designated claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters 
in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings 
until the order is obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part 
thereof, or render judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable 
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure; 
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to 
submit to a physical or mental examination, as contempt of court; and 
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the 
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as requested 
under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter 
proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, 
the party requesting the admissions may apply to the court for an 
order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses 
incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The 
court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held 
objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was 
of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had 
reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or 
(4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to 
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
unuei r\uit: o\J{U)\p) ui ox\a) LVJ tcsuiy un ucnan ui a \ia\ uy iaii3 ( x j LU 
appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being 
served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to 
interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the 
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for 
inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the 
request, the court. on motion may take any action authorized by 
Subdivision (b)(2). 
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The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on 
the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party 
failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 
26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party 
or attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a 
discovery plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court on 
motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document 
or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to 
amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that 
party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other 
material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the 
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in 
lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action 
authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the 
inherent power of the court to take any action authorized by 
Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or 
fails to preserve a document, tangible item, electronic data or other 
evidence in violation of a duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a 
court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing 
to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the 
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO vs. MARK H ROBBINS 
NUMBER 030917018 Miscellaneous 
2NT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
IES 
Defendant - MARK H ROBBINS 
Represented by: JEFFREY M JONES 
Represented by: JAMES S LOWRIE 
Represented by: DAVID W TUFTS 
Defendant - CHEROKEE & WALKER INVESTMENT C 
Represented by: FRANCIS M WIKSTROM 
Defendant - CHEROKEE AND WLKER LLC 
Represented by: FRANCIS M WIKSTROM 
Other Party - JEFFREY M JONES 
Defendant - BARBARA LAVERN WORTHINGTON 
Defendant - JP MORGAN CHASE BANK 
Represented by: JOHN A BECKSTEAD 
Defendant - BANK ONE UTAH 
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO 
Represented by: JOHN A BECKSTEAD 
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO 
Represented by: RICHARD D BURBIDGE 
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO 
Represented by: JAMES S JARDINE 
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO 
Represented by: JEFFREY M JONES 
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO 
Represented by: MATTHEW R LEWIS 
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO 
Represented by: ROBERT J SHELBY 
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ASE NUMBER 030917018 Miscellaneous 
Plaintiff - BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO 
Represented by: JASON R HULL 
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: 7.50 
Amount Paid: 7.50 
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 1.2 5 
Amount Paid: 1.25 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 37.25 
Amount Paid: 37.25 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 8.00 
Amount Paid: 8.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 









REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 23.00 
Amount Paid: 23.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
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Stipulated Protective Order/Dismd as to Cherokee & Walker, 
L.L.C.'s 
'OCEEDINGS 
'-31-03 Filed: Complaint 
-31-03 Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING assigned. 
-31-03 Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE 
-31-03 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
-31-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
-31-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 75.00 
-31-03 COMPLAINT 10K-MORE Payment Received: 155.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE; Code 
Description: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
-31-03 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL Payment Received: 75.00 
'-16-03 Filed: Answer of Bank One NA 
BANE: ONE UTAH 
-03-03 Filed: Answer of Cherokee & Walker 
CHEROKEE & WALKER INVESTMENT C 
CHEROKEE AND WLKER LLC 
-2 9-03 Filed: Motion for summary judgment of defendant Bank One, NA 
-29-03 Filed: Memorandum in support of Bank One's motion for summary 
j udgment 
-12-03 Filed: Pltf Bodell Construction Company's reply memorandum in 
opposition to Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment 
-12-03 Filed: Affidavit of Michael J Bodell 
-24-03 Filed: Bank One's Notice of Intent to Apportion Fault Pursuant 
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to Utah Code Sections 78-27-39, 78-27-41 (4) & 78-27-38 (4)(a) 
1-03 Filed: Bank One's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
4-03 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision & Request for Hearing 
1-03 Filed: Cherokees & Walker's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
1-03 Filed: Cherokee & Walker's Joinder in Motion for Summary 
Judgment of Defendant Bank ONe, NA 
1-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Cherokee & Walker's Motion for • 
Partial Summary Judgment 
3-03 Filed: Note: Clerk is to hold Pltf's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, that Deft's Motion for Summary Judgment can be heard 
at the same time. 
3-03 Filed: Supplemental Affidavit of Gregg Christensen 
8-03 Filed: Letter to the Court from Brian Cheney, Re: postponing 
Hearing on Bank One's Motion so that the two motions for 
Summary Judgment can be heard at the same time, Dated 12-3-03. 
5-03 Filed: Pltf Bodell Construction Company's Rule 56(f) Motion to 
continue Cherokee & Walker LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment to 
permit discovery 
5-03 Filed: Affidavit of Richard D Burbidge 
5-03 Filed: Pltf Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in support 
of Rule 56 (f) Motion to continue Cherokee & Walker LLC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment to permit discovery 
5-03 Filed: Pltf Bodell Construction Company's Reply Memorandum in 
Opposition to Cherokee & Walker's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Re: Settlement Agreement 
9-03 Filed: Cert of Service (Pltf Bodell Const Co's first set of 
interrogatories & request for production of documents to Bank 
One, Utah) 
'9-03 Filed: Cert of Service (Pltf Bodell Construction Company's 
First set of Interrogatories & Requests for Production of 
Documents to Cherokee & Walker Investment Company LLC & 
Cherokee & Walker LLC) 
H-03 Filed order: Minute Entry on Mediation (the parties "Scheduling 
Order" is returned to counsel that this case may be considered 
for mediation) 
Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING 
Signed December 31, 2003 
)5-04 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Cherokee and Walker's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re Settlement Agreement 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
D5-04 Filed: Request to Submit Cherokee & Walker's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment Re Settlement Agreement for Decision (Oral 
Argument Requested) 
35-04 Filed: Cherokee and Walker's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plantiff Bodell Construction Company's Rule 56(f) Motion to 
Continue Cherokee and Walker, L.L.C.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment to Permit Discovery 
05-04 Filed: Request for Oral Argument on Plaintiff Bodell 
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Construction Company's Rule 56(f) Motino to Continue Cherokee 
and Walker, L.L.C.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
1-07-04 Filed: Acceptance of Service (Jeffrey M Jones Esq on behalf of 
Mark H Robbins) 
1-07-04 Filed return: Summons & Complaint & Jury Demand (Jeffrey M 
Jones Attny) 
Party Served: ROBBINS, MARK H 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: December 31, 2003 
1-13-04 Filed order: Scheduling Order (Case is trying mediation) 
Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING 
Signed January 13, 2 004 
1-15-04 Filed: Pltf Bodell Construction Company's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Rule 56 (f) Motion to Continue Cherokee & Walker 
LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment to Permit Discovery 
1-15-04 Filed: Note: Both Motions for Summary Judgment may be heard at 
the same hearing. 
1-16-04 Filed: Cert of Serv of Deft Bank One, NA's Rule 26(a) (1) 
Initial Disclosures 
1-20-04 Filed: Cert of Serv (Initial Disclosures of Cherokee & Walker) 
L-21-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 5836466 
ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS is scheduled. 
Date: 03/01/2004 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: WILLIAM B BOHLING 
***COURTESY COPIES REQUESTED FIVE DAYS BEFORE HEARING*** 
L-21-04 ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS scheduled on March 01, 2004 at 10:00 AM 
in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge BOHLING. 
L-26-04 Filed: Answer of Mark H. Robbins 
MARK H ROBBINS 
L-27-04 Filed: Certificate of Service 
2-12-04 Filed: Joinder in Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment 
>-13-04 Filed: Certificate of Service 
5-01-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: WILLIAM B BOHLING 
Clerk: melbar 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RICHARD BURBIDGE 
JOHN A BECKSTEAD 
Defendant's Attorney(s): FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM 
JAMES BLANCH 
DAVID TUFTS 
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Video 
Tape Number: 10:23 A.M. 
ADD 36 
HEARING 
TAPE: 10:23 A.M. On record Before the Court are all outstanding 
motions. Counsel make their arguments to the Court. The Court, 
after hearing argument of counsel and having read the memoranda as 
submitted, denies defendant Ban One's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and 
denies Cherokee & Walker's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, as 
stated on the record. Counsel then argue the 56(f) motion of 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction to Continue Cherokee & Walker, LLC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment to Permit Discovey. 
The motion is granted. Mr. Burbidge is to prepare the order. 
5-04 Filed: Certificate of Service 
5-04 Filed order: Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Granting Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion to Continue 
C&W's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING 
Signed March 15, 2004 
5-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's Responses to 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents 
1-04 Filed: Certificate of Service (Cherokee & Walker's Responses to 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Co.'s 1st Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents & Certificate of 
Service) 
i2-04 Filed: Bank One's Motion for Protective Order 
>2-04 Filed: Bank One's Memorandum in Support of Motion iui 
Protective Order 
»8-04 Filed: Pltf Bodell Const. Co.'s Consolidated Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Compel Production of Doc's From Bank 0TH <!. 
in Opposition to Bank One's Motion for Protective Order 
)8-04 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Motion to Compel 
Discovery From Bank One 
)8-04 Filed: Affidavit of Richard D. Burbidge 
)9-04 Filed: Certificate of Service 
L4-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant Robbins• Response to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents 
27-04 Filed: Bank One's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for 
Protective Order and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel 
35-04 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Compel 
05-04 Filed: Request to Submit to for Decision md Oral Argument 
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(Motion to Compel Discovery from Bank One) 
07-04 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision and Request for Hearing 
(Motion for Protective Order) 
5-13-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's First Set of 
Requests for Admissions Interrogatories, and Requests for 
Production of Documents To Bodell Construction Company 
5-24-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 5953235 
LAW AND MOTION is scheduled. 
Date: 07/28/2004 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
45 0 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: WILLIAM B BOHLING 
***COURTESY COPIES ARE REQUESTED FIVE DAYS BEFORE HEARING*** 
5-24-04 LAW AND MOTION scheduled on July 28, 2004 at 10:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W42 with Judge BOHLING. 
S-14-04 Filed: Certificate of Service (Pltf Bodell Construction Co.'s 
Responses to Bank One's 1st Set of Requests for Admissions, 
Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Doc's) 
7-28-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: WILLIAM B BOHLING 
Clerk: melbar 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JOHN A BECKSTEAD 
RICHARD BURBIDGE 
Video 
Tape Number: 10:48 
HEARING 
TAPE: 10:48 On record Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel and Bank One's Motion for Protective Order. The motions are 
argued to the Court by counsel. The Court after hearing argument, 
and having read the memoranda as submitted, 
grants the Motion to Compel. Twenty days is given to respond. The 
Motion for Protective Order is to remain in place. Mr. Burbidge 
is requested to prepare the order. 
7-28-04 Filed: Amended Scheduling Order (Case is trying mediation) 
B-05-04 Filed: Certificate of Service (Plaintiff Bodell Construction 
Company's Supplemental Response to Bank One's First Set of 
Requests for Admissions) 
8-09-04 Filed order: Order (Motion to Compel of Bodell Construction is 
granted) 
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Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING 
Signed August 09, 2004 
B-18-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's First Set of 
Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents to 
Total Due: 7. 
Total Due: 4 
Payment Received: 
Payment Received: 







Mark H. Robbins 
3-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 8.25 
3-04 COPY FEE Payment Received: 8.2 5 
£-04 Filed: Notice of Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum (without 
testimony) Commanding Production or Inspection of Documents 
4-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 4 0.00 
4-04 Fee Account created Total Due: ^ nn 
4-04 CERTIFIED COPIES Payment Received: 4 0.00 
4-04 CERTIFICATION Payment Received: 8.00 
5-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Robbins1 First Set of 
Discovery Requests to Plaintiff 
6-04 Issued: Commission for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum 
(without testimony) 
Judge WILLIAM B BOHLING 
7-04 Fee Account created 
7-04 Fee Account created 
7-04 CERTIFIED COPIES 
7-04 CERTIFICATION 
7-04 Filed: Certificate of ; 
Discovery Requests to Bank One 
0-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Robbins' First Set of 
Discovery Requests to Cherokee and Walker Defendants 
0-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant Robbins' Response to 
Bank One's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents 
:3-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's Amended and 
Supplemetal Responses to Plaintiff Bodell Construction 
Company's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents 
13-04 Filed: Certificate of Service 
>0-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's Responses to 
Defendant Mark H. Robbins' First Set of Discovery Requests to 
Bank One 
25-04 Judge BRUCE LUBECK assigned. 
)l-04 Filed: Certificate of Service of Cherokee & Walker's Responses 
to Defendant Mark H. Robbins1 First Set of Discovery Requests 
)5-04 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Second Set of 
Interrogarories and Request for Production of Documents to Bank 
One, Utah 
35-04 Filed: Certificate of Service (Pltf Bodell Construction Co.'s 
2nd Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Document to Bank One, Utah) 
22-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 8.00 
22-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 4.0 0 
22-04 CERTIFIED COPIES Payment Received: 8.0 0 
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22-04 CERTIFICATION Payment Received: 4.00 
30-04 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion for Leave to 
File Amendment to Answer (Oral Argument Requested) 
30-04 Filed: Bank One's Motion for Leave to File Amendment to Answer 
03-04 Filed order: Second Scheduling Order (Case will attempt 
mediation) 
Judge BRUCE LUBECK 
Signed December 02, 2004 
2-14-04 Filed: Notice of Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum (without 
testimony) Commanding Production or Inspection of Documents 
1-04-05 Filed: Notice of Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum (without 
testimony) Commanding Production or Inspection of Documents 
1-10-05 Filed: Stipulation to Motion for Leave to File Amnedment to 
Answer 
1-11-05 Filed order: Order Granting Bank One Leave to file Amendment to 
Answer 
Judge BRUCE LUBECK 
Signed January 11, 2 005 
1-12-05 Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum (without testimony) 
Party Served: OLIPHANT, ROGER 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: January 05, 2005 
1-18-05 Filed: Motion for Order Substituting Party 
1-19-05 Filed order: Order for Substitution of Party (JPMorgan Chase 
Bank is substituted as Defendant in place of Bank One) 
Defendant will still be referred to in pleadings as Bank One. 
Judge BRUCE LUBECK 
Signed January 19, 2 005 
1-21-05 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's Responses to 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Second Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents 
1-27-05 Filed: Amendment to Answer of Bank One, NA 
i-31-05 Filed order: Stipulated Protective Order 
Judge BRUCE LUBECK 
Signed March 30, 2005 
1-08-05 Filed: Bank One's Motion for Protective Order 
1-08-05 Filed: Bank One's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Protective Order 
1-13-05 Filed: Notice of Videotape Deposition of Mark H. Robbins 
1-14-05 Filed: Notice of Depositions 
1-14-05 Filed: Deposition Subpoena 
1-14-05 Filed: Deposition Subpoena 
1-14-05 Filed: Notice of Depositions 
1-14-05 Filed: Notice of Deposition 
1-28-05 Filed: Amended Notice of Videotape Deposition of Mark H. 
Robbins 
5-05-05 Filed: Notice of Depositions 
5-09-05 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Second Motion to 
Compel Production of Documents from Bank One 
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5-09-05 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Consolidated 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Production of 
Documents from Bank One and in Opposition to Bank One's Motion 
for Protective* Order 
5-11-05 Issued: Commission for Issuance of Subpoena From Illinois 
Circuit Court 
Judge BRUCE LUBECK 
-05 Filed: Notice of Videotape Deposition of Marc Jenson 
-05 Filed: Certificate of Service 
-05 Filed: Notice of Records Deposition 
-05 Filed: Notice of Records Deposition 
-05 Filed return: Subpeona duces tecum 
Party Served: Brent Price 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 16, 2005 
-05 Filed return: Amended Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Party Served: Brent Price (Reg. Agent) 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 18, 2005 
-05 Filed: Amended Notice of Records Deposition 
-05 Filed: Certificate of Service (Plaintiff Bodell Cons Co.'s 3rd 
Set of Interrogatories & 4th Set of Requests for Production of 
Documents to Bank One) 
•-05 Filed: Notice of Videotape Deposition of Benjamin Lightner (on 
6-22-05) 
;-05 Filed: Notice of Videotape Rule 30(b) (6j Deposition of 
Defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A. 
*-05 Filed: Notice of Videotape Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of 
Defendant Cherokee and Walker, L.L.C 
$-05 Filed: Notice of Videotape Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of 
Defendant Cherokee & Walker Investment Company, L.L.C dm 
6/23/05) 
1-05 Filed: Bank One's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for 
Protective Order and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff 
Bodell Construction Company's Second Motion to Compel 
1-05 Filed: Amended Notice of Depositions 
1-05 Filed: Amended Notice of Depositions 
1-05 Filed: Notice of Records Deposition 
1-05 Filed: Subpoena Duces Tecum (Merrill Lynch) 
9-05 Filed: Amended Notice of Deposition of Michael Peterson 
3-05 Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY assigned. 
3-05 Filed return: Amended Deposition Subpoena 
Party Served: ROBBINS, MARK H 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 06, 2 005 






June 07, 2 0 05 
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13-05 Filed return: Amended Deposition Subpoena 
Party Served: David Babcock 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 06, 2005 
13-05 Filed: Certificate of Service of Bank One's Response to 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's 3rd Set of Requests for 
Production of Documents to Bank One 
'7-06-05 Filed: Certificate of service of Bank One's responses to 
plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's third set of 
interrogatories and fourth set of requests for production of 
documents to Bank One, Utah 
>8-19-05 Filed: Amended notice of videotape rule 30 (B)(6) deposition of 
defendant Cherokee and Walker Investment Company, L.L.C. 
18-19-05 Filed: Amended notice of videotape rule 30(b)(6) deposition of 
defendant Cherokee and Walker, L.L.C. 
19-07-05 Filed: Deposition of Marc Jenson no changes have been made 
'9-19-05 Filed: Defendant Mark H. Robbins' motion to compel response to 
discovery requests from Bank One. 
19-20-05 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Third Motion to 
Compel Production of Documents from Bank One 
•9-2 0-05 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in 
Support of its Third Motion to Compel Production of Documents 
From Bank One 
19-21-05 Filed: Reply memorandum in support of Bodell's second motion to 
compel production of documents from Bank One 
0-05-05 Filed: Bank One's reply memorandum in support of its motion for 
protective order and memorandum in opposition to defendant Mark 
H. Robbins' motion to compel 
0-07-05 Filed: Bank One's memorandum in opposition to plaintiff Bodell 
Contruction Company's third motion to compel 
0-12-05 Filed: Bank One's memorandum in support of motion to extend 
deadline to file dispositive motions 
0-12-05 Filed: Bank One's motion to extend deadline to file dispositive 
motions 
0-13-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.25 
0-13-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.25 
0-13-05 Filed: Defendants Cherokee & Walker Investment Company, L.L.C. 
and Cherokee and and Walker, L.L.C.'s Joinder in Bank One's 
Motion to Extend Deadline to File Dispositive Motions 
0-14-05 Filed: Joinder in Bank One's motion to extend deadline to file 
dispositive motions 
0-20-05 Filed: Reply memorandum in support of defendant Mark H. 
Robbins' motion to compel response to discovery requests from 
Bank One 
2-07-05 Filed: Notice to Submit for decision Bank One's motion to 
extend deadline to file dispositive motions 
2-15-05 Filed: Notice to Submit discovery motions for decisions and 
request for hearing, Re; 1-Bank one's motion for protective 
order 2-Plaintiff Bodell construction company's second motion 
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to compel production of documents from bank one 3-Defendant 
Mark 
2-19-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 6484860 
DEFT'S MOTION TO EXTEND is scheduled. 
Date: 01/06/2006 
Time: 03:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
-05 DEFT'S MOTION TO EXTEND scheduled on January 06, 2006 at 03:00 
PM in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
-05 Fee Account created Total Due: V* /r> 
-05 COPY FEE Payment Received: U "> 
-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 6490938 
DEFT'S MOTION TO EXTEND. 
Date: 1/6/2006 
Time: 03:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
The reason for the change is Court Ordered 
All pending motions shall be heard on 1-6-06 at 3:00 P.M. 
>-05 DEFT'S MOTION TO EXTEND scheduled on January 06, 2006 at 03:00 
PM in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
}-05 DEFT'S MOTION TO EXTEND Cancelled. 
S-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Clerk: melbar 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROBERT SHELBY 
JOHN A BECKSTEAD 
Defendant' ' A1 t * >i ney (s) : DAVID W TUFTS 
JAMES BLANCH 
Video 
Tape Number: 3:04:23 Tape Count: 4:18:45 
HEARING 
TAPE: 3:04:23 On record Before the Court is Motion Hearing. The 
issues open for argument are, 1) Bank One •s production of bank 
records, and 2) Third Set of Requests re: marketing materials. 
The Court, after hearing argument of counsel, and having read the 
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memoranda 
as submitted, rules as stated on the record. The parties state 
they will attend a mediation on February 16, 2006. Mr. Shelby is 
requested to prepare the order, within five days, with ten days to 
object. 
25-06 Filed order: Order Regarding Outstanding Motions 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed January 25, 2 00 6 
25-06 Filed order: Third Amended Scheduling Order 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed January 25, 2 0 06 
2-16-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.25 
2-16-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.25 
2-28-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 5.25 
2-28-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 5.25 
Note: 6.00 cash tendered. 0.75 change given. 
3-16-06 Filed: Certificate of service 
3-27-06 Filed: Notice of videotape deposition of Benjamin Lightner 
3-27-06 Filed: Notice of Videotape rule 30(b)(6) deposition of 
defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A. 
4-04-06 Filed: Notice of deposition of Trevor Larsen 
4-04-06 Filed: Notice of deposition of David Babcock 
4-17-06 Filed: Certificate of Service (Plaintiff Bodel Const. Co.'s 4th 
Set of Interrogatories to Bank One, Utah) 
5-15-06 Filed: Notice of continuation of videotape rule 30(b)(6) 
deposition of defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A. 
5-15-06 Filed: Notice of continuation of videotape rule 30(b)(6) 
deposition of defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A. 
5-15-06 Filed: Certificate of service of responses to plaintiff Bodell 
Construction Company's fourth set of interrogatodries to Bank 
One, Utah 
5-23-06 Filed: Motion Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's motion 
for permission to file first amended complaint to add claim for 
common law fraud 
5-23-06 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's memorandum in 
support of motion for permission to file first amended 
complaint to add claim for common law fraud 
5-25-06 Filed: Transcript of Motion hearing dated 1-6-06, Carolyn 
Erickson, CCT 
5-26-06 Filed: (Transcription) Law & Motion Hearing 1/6/06. 
5-02-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.50 
5-02-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.50 
5-06-06 Filed: Joint Motion for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice of 
Claims Against Cherokee & Walker Investment Company L.L.C., and 
Cherokee & Walker L.L.C 
5-06-06 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's 4th Motion to 
Compel Discovery From JP Morgan Chase Bank 
5-06-06 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in 
Support of 4th Motion to Compel Discovery From Defendant JP 
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Morgan Chase Bank 
5-06-06 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion for Voluntary 
Dismissal with Prejudice of Claims Against Cherokee & Walker 
Investment Company, L.L.C, and Cherokee & Walker L.L.C. 
5-06-06 Filed order: Order Granting Plaintiff Bodell Construction Co.'s 
Motion for Permission to File First Amended Complaint to Add 
Claim for Fraud 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed June 06, 2 006 
5-07-06 Filed: Memornadum of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. in opposition to 
plainitff Bodell Construction Company's motion for permission 
to file first amended complaint to add claim for common law 
fraud 
f-06 Filed order: Order Dismissing Calims Against Cherokee & Walker 
Investment Company, L.L.C., and Cherokee & Walker, L.L.C. with 
Prejudice 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed June 07, 2006 
)-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
)-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
3-06 Filed: Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Permission to File 
Overlength Memorandum 
L-06 Filed order: Order (Plaintiff is granted leave to file 
overlength memorandum) 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed June 20, 2006 
1-06 Filed: Certificate of service of JP Morgan Chase Bank, IJ »' . • s 
second request for production of documents to Bodell 
Construction Company 
7-06 Filed: Certificate of service of Robbins second set of requests 
for production of document to plaintiff 
7-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 6681212 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE is scheduled. 
Date: 08/07/2006 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
7-06 MOTION TO SET ASIDE scheduled on Augusf 0/ ?006 at 01:30 PM in 
Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
7-06 Filed: Letter to the Court from John A. Beckstead; dated 
7-12-06 
9-06 Filed: Certificate of service (response to defendant Mark H. 
Robbins' second request for production of documents 
7-06 Filed: Stipulation for Extension 
1-06 Filed: Ex parte motion for leave to file overlength memorandum 
in opposition to fourth motion to compel 
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31-06 Filed: Affidavit of Brian Lydon in opposition to plaintiff 
Bodell Construction Company's fourth motion to compel discovery 
from JP Morgan Chase Bank (FILED UNDER SEAL) 
31-06 Filed: memorandum of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. in opposition I i 
fourth motion to compel discovery 
31-06 Filed order: Order for Extension 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed July 31, 2 006 
01-06 Filed order: Order Granting Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File 
Overlength Memorandum in Opposition to Fourth Motion to Compel 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
ADD 45 
Signed August 01, 2006 
3-04-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 18.75 
3-04-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 18.75 
3-07-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Miscellaneous 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Clerk: melbar 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROBERT SHELBY 
Video 
Mr. Shelby requests on behalf of counsel in the above case to have 
hearing of August 7, 2 006, continued to either September 11th or 
September 18th, for hearing on all three outstanding motions. Mr. 
Shelby will send an amended notice of hearing. 
3-07-06 MOTION TO SET ASIDE rescheduled on September 18, 2006 at 10:30 
AM Reason: Counsel's request.. 
3-08-06 Filed: Amended notice of hearing 
5-11-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 31.00 
5-11-06 COPY FEE Payment Received: 31.00 
5-12-06 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's ex parte motion 
for leave to file overlength reply memorandum in support of 
fourth motion to compel discovery from defendant JP Morgan 
Chase Bank, N.A. 
5-12-06 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's reply memorandum 
in support of fourth motion to compel discovery from defendant 
JP Morgan Chase Bank 
5-13-06 Filed order: Order Granting Plaintiff Bodell Construction 
Company's Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Overlength Reply 
Memorandum 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed September 13, 2006 
5-18-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Clerk: melbar 
PRESENT 
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Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JOHN A BECKSTEAD 
ROBERT SHELBY 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID W TUFTS 
Video 
Tape Number: 10:32:20 Tape Count: 11:34:25 
HEARING 
TAPE: 10:32:20 On record Before the Court is Motion for Leave to 
Amend Complaint. The Court, after hearing argument of counsel and 
having read the documents as submitted, grants the motion as stated 
on the record. Mr. Shelby is to file the amended complaint by 
October 13, 2 0 06. Counsel are given to January 31, 2007 to work 
out issues. Mr. Tufts is requested to prepare the order on 
hearing, 
by November 17, 2006. 
9-06 Filed: First amended complaint 
1-06 Filed order: Order Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to 
Amend and Motion to Compel 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed September 21, 2006 
3-06 Filed: Answer 
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK 
9-06 Filed: Memorandum in support of motion of JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A. for partial summary judgment on fraud claim (oral 
argument requested) 
9-06 Filed: Motion of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. for partial summary 
judgment on fraud claim 
8-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
8-07 Fee Account created Total Due: I 
8-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.0 0 
8-07 Filed: Transcript of hearing on motions dated 9-18-06, Carolyn 
Erickson, CCT 
6-07 Filed: Stipulation Re: Discovery Matters 
:9-07 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion of JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, N.A. for Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud Claim 
!9-07 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion of JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, N.A. For Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud Claim 
H-07 Filed: Note: because of illness of counsel and upon agreement 
by all counsel, the report due today regarding mediation is 
extended to Feb. 10, 2007. 
)l-07 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision (oral aiquinenl i^quesLetlj 
)7-07 Filed: Status Report 
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21-07 Filed: Notice of Continuation of Rule 30(b)(6) Depostition of 
Defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A. 
23-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 11026260 
PARTIAL SUMM JGMT& SCHED CONF is scheduled. 
Date: 04/06/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
23-07 PARTIAL SUMM JGMT& SCHED CONF scheduled on April 06, 2007 at 
09:00 AM in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
2-27-07 Filed: Certificate of Service (plaintiff bodell construction 
company's fifth set of interrogatories to bank one, Utah) 
3-23-07 Filed: Certifidate of Service of Responses to Plaintiff Bodell 
Construction Company's Fifth Set of Interrogatories to Bank 
One, Utah 
3-26-07 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant Mark Robbins' 
Initial Disclosures 
3-26-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.75 
3-26-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.75 
3-28-07 Filed: Notice of Videotaped Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of 
Defendant Bank One, Utah, N.A. 
3-30-07 Filed: Mark Robbins' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Filed by: ROBBINS, MARK H 
3-30-07 Filed: Affidavit of Mark Robbins in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
3-30-07 Filed: Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Defendant Mark Robbins 
4-05-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Supplemental 
Materials in Opposition to Defendant Bank One's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 22, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 23, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 24, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 25, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 26, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 29, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
4-06-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 30, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
1-06-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
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Clerk: melbar 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROBERT SHELBY 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN A BECKSTEAD 
JASON HULL 
ERIC OLSEN 
Other Parties: ROBERT SHELBY 
Video 
Tape Number: 9:05 Tape Count: 10:30 
HEARING 
Ann AH 
TAPE: 9:05 On record Bank One's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Bodell Construction's Fraud Claim is before the Court. 
The Court, after hearing argument of counsel, and having viewed 
the exhibits as shown, reserves ruling on the motion, and sets 
further hearing on September 22, 2007 at 9:00 A.M. (all motions). 
Motion cutoff is set on July 1, 2 007, with response due by July 
21, 2007. A 7 day jury trial is set to begin on October 22, 2007 
at 9:00 A.M. Counsel are to stipulate to jury instructions and 
jury voir dire. 
Mr. Shelby is to prepare an order on hearing and notice of trial. 
The Court, after hearing argument of counsel, having reviewed the 
documents as submitted, 
JURY TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 10/22/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
45 0 SOUTH STATE 
• SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 10/23/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 10/24/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 10/25/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 10/26/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 10/29/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 10/30/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
1-06-07 ALL PENDING MOTIONS scheduled on September 10, 2007 at 09:00 AM 
in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
5-23-07 Filed: Mark Robbins' Rule 9(1) Designation of Non-Party for 
Allocation of Fault 
5-24-07 Filed: Notice of Change of Address (John A. Beckstead) 
5-29-07 Filed order: Scheduling Order and Order on Motions (the parties 
are to report to the Court in writing by 9-22-07, their good 
faith efforts at mediation) 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
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Signed May 25, 2007 
7-02-07 Filed: Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight 
Filed by: ROBBINS, MARK H 
7-02-07 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Hearing of (1) Motion to 
Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight and (2) Motion to 
Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines 
Filed by: ROBBINS, MARK H 
7-02-07 Filed: Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert 
Deadlines 
Filed by: ROBBINS, MARK H 
7-02-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of (1) Motion to Exclude Expert 
Testimony of Merrill Weight and (2) Motion to Reopen Fact 
Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines 
7-03-07 Filed: Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's 
Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims 
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, 
1-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiff's Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation 
Claims 
)-07 Filed: Joinder in Defendant Bank One's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiff's Fraud Claims 
I-07 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Hearing of Bank One's 
Motion to Extend Expert Deadlines 
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, 
$-07 Filed: Bank One's Joinder in Robbins Motion to Exclude Expert 
Testimony of Merrill Weight and Motion to Extend Expert 
Deadlines 
3-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Joinder in Robbins 
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight and Motion 
to Extend Expert Deadlines 
3-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 11165056 
EX PARTE MOTION TO EXTEND is scheduled. 
Date: 07/27/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
3-07 EX PARTE MOTION TO EXTEND scheduled on July 27, 2007 at 09:00 
AM in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
3-07 EX PARTE MOTION TO EXTEND scheduled on July 27, 200/ at 09:00 
AM in Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
6-07 Filed: Certificate of Service of Notice of Deposition of Gary M 
Schwartz 
6-07 Filed: Joinder in Defendant Bank One's Motion to Extend Expert 
Deadlines 
6-07 Filed: Objection to Bank One's Notice of Deposition of Gary M 
Schwartz 
Lted: 04/30 H 13:30:20 Page 23 
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L8-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Bank One's Joinder in Robins' Motion to 
Extend Expert Deadlines 
L8-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Consolidated 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Mark Robbins' Motions: 
(1) to Exclude Testimony of Merrill Weight, and (">) to Reopen 
Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines 
25-07 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of (1) Motion to Exclude 
Expert Testimony of Merrill Wight and (2) Motion to Reopen Fact 
Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines 
25-07 Filed: Notice of Allocation of Fault Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
78-27-41(4) and U.R.C.P. 9(1) 
26-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion to Exclude 
Portions of the Expert Testimony of Gary Schwartz 
26-07 Filed: Bank One's Motion to Exclude Portions of the Expert 
Testimony of Gary Schwartz 
Filed by: BANK ONE UTAH, 
7-26-07 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Hearing of Bank One's 
Motion to Exclude Portions of the Expert Testimony of Gary 
Schwartz 
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, 
7-27-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Clerk: melbar 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs Attorney (s): ROBERT J SHELBY 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID W TUFTS 
DOUGLAS OWENS 
Video 
Tape Number: 9:03:40 Tape Count: 9:45:15 
HEARING 
TAPE: 9:03:40 On record Before the Court is Defendants' Ex Parte 
Motion to Extend Expert Witness Time, Motion to Exclude Expert 
Testimony of Merrill Wight, and Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery. 
The Court, after hearing argument of counsel, and having reviewed 
the documents as submitted, grants motion to Strike Testimony of 
Merrill Wight. Mr. Tufts is to prepare an order on hearing. 
7-27-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.25 
7-27-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.25 
B-03-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Mark 
Robbins 
3-03-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Motion for Leave 
to File Overlong Memorandum 
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Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO, 
3-03-07 Filed order: Order Granting PLaintiff Bodell Construction 
Company's Motion for Leave to File Overlength Memorandum 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed August 03, 2007 
3-03-07 Filed: Certificate of Service 
3-08-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 
3-08-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 
3-08-07 Note: Aaron Munro Visa on behalf of Burbidge 
3-08-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 
3-08-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
3-09-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 
3-09-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 
3-14-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment 
3-17-07 Filed: Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for JP Morgan Chase Bank, 
N.A. 










-07 Filed: Certificate of Service of Expert Report of Robert 
Haertel 
-07 Filed order: Order Granting Mark Robbins' Motion to Exclude 
Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed August 22, 2007 
-07 Filed: Notice of Substitution of Counsel 
-07 Filed order: Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for 
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Tyler Murray, Brian C. Cheney, 
Emily V. Smith and Snell and Wilmer) 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed August 23, 2007 
-07 Filed: Objection to Subpoena to Merrill Weight for (1) Taking 
of Deposition and (2) Production of Documents 
r
-07 Filed: Subpoena for (1) Taking of Deposition and (2) Production 
of Documents 
'-07 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Merrill Weight 
1-07 Filed: Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Bank 
One's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment Motion 
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, 
L-07 Filed: Reply in Support of Bank One's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiff's Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation 
Claims 
1-07 Filed order: Order Granting Unopposed Motion for Extension of 
Time to File Bank ONe's Reply In Support of Summary Judgment 
Motion 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed September 04, 2 007 
4-07 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins1 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
7-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.25 
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7-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.25 
0-07 LAW AND MOTION scheduled on October 03, 2007 at 08:30 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W42 with Judge KENNEDY. 
.0-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030917018 ID 11219305 
LAW AND MOTION is scheduled. 
Date: 10/03/2007 
Time: 0 8:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
before Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
LO-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Clerk: amberlw 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JASON R HULL 
JAMES S JARDINE 
ADD S3 
MATTHEW R LEWIS 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN A BECKSTEAD 
DAVID W TUFTS 
Video 
Tape Number: 9:02:38 Tape Count: 10:39:28 
HEARING 
TAPE: 9:02:38 On record before the Court is Robbin's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment. This 
matter will be taken under advisement. 
Mr. Jardine is to prepare a brief reconsidering Judge Bohling's 
2004 ruling by 9/17. Response is due by 9/27. 
LAW AND MOTION is scheduled. 
Date: 10/03/2007 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W42 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
45 0 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
before Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
9-11-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 37.25 
9-11-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 37.25 
Note: 3 8.00 cash tendered. 0.75 change given. 
9-14-07 Filed: Stipulated Motion to Extend Time to File Motions in 
Limine and Opposition Briefs 
Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO, 
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9-14-07 Filed order: Order Granting Stipulated Motion for Extension of 
Time to File Motions in Limine (to 9-28-07), and Opposition 
Briefs (to Oct. 10, 2007) 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed September 14, 2007 
9-17-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
9-17-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.00 
9-18-07 Filed: Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Defendant 
Bank One's Request to Reconsider the Prior Ruling on Accord and 
Satisfaction 
9-26-07 Filed: Bodell Construction Company's Witness List 
9-26-07 Filed: Joint Statement Regarding Parties Good Faith Efforts at 
Mediation 
9-26-07 Filed: Joint Statement of the Case 
9-26-07 Filed: Defendant Mark Robbins' Witness List 
9-26-07 Filed: Witness List of JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA 
9-26-07 Filed: Stipulated Voir Dire and non-Stipulated Voir Dire 
Questions Requested by Each Party 
9-26-07 Filed: Bank One's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding the Court's 
Authority to Reconsider the Prior Ruling on Accord and 
Satisfaction 
-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 
4: Exclusion of Evidence of Wealth or Financial Contradiction 
-07 Filed: Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 4: Exclusion of 
Evidence of Wealth or Financial Condition 
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, 
-07 Filed: Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 2: Exclusion of 
Evidence of Certain Documents Not Relied Upon by Bodell 
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, 
-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 
2: Exclusion of Evidence Certain Documents Not Relied Upon by 
Bodell 
-07 Filed: Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 3: Exclusion of 
Evidence of Other Bank one Lawsuits 
Filed by: JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, 
-07 Filed return: Subpoena and Witness Fee (Benjamin LiqhLnei) 
Party Served: LIGHTNER, BENJAMIN 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: September 22, 2007 
r
-07 Filed: Order on Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 2: Exclusion 
of Evidence of Certain Documents not Relied Upon by Bodell 
f-07 Filed: Order on Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 4: Exclusion 
of Evidence of Wealth or Financial Condition 
5-07 Filed: (Proposed) Order Granting Plaintiff Bodell Construction 
Company's Motion in Limine Requesting Spoliation Sanctions for 
Lost or Destroyed Bank One Account Records and Bank One's 
Failure to Comply with Rule 30(B) (6) 
3-07 Filed: (Proposed) Order Granting Motion in Limine to Exclude 
Loan and Escrow Agreements Purportedly Executed by Arimex 
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8-07 Filed: (Proposed) Order Granting Motion in Limine to Exclude 
the Proposed Expert Report and Testimony of Ronald Haertel 
8-07 Filed: (Proposed) Order Granting Plaintiff Bodell Construction 
Company's Motion in Limine Requesting Spoliation Sanctions for 
Lost or Destroyed Bank One Account Records and Bank One's 
Failure to Comply with Rule 30(B) (6) 
8-07 Filed: (Proposed) Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 
to Exclude Cherokee and Walker and Certain Non-Parties From 
Apportionment of Fault 
il-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion in Limine No. 
3: Exclusion of Evidence of Other Bank One Lawsuits 
11-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 8.On 
11-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 8.00 
Note: 2 0.00 cash tendered. 12 change given. 
)l-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Eighth 
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Testimony of David Babcock and 
Trevor Larsen Relating to Sales by Wasatch Cycles Prior to 
January 2 001 
)l-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Seventh 
Motion in Limine Against an Advisory Jury on Plaintiff's Unjust 
Enrichment Claim 
Ann fis 
0-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Fifth 
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Settlement Discussions and 
Offers 
0-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins* Third 
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Evidence of Robbins' Financial 
Condition and Wealth 
0-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Second 
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Evidence of Conspiracy with 
"Known" Individuals 
0-01-07 Filed: Defendant Mark Robbins' Motions in Limine 
Filed by: ROBBINS, MARK H 
0-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Ninth 
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Questioning and Evidence 
Relating to Gifts Rumored to be Given to Benjamin Lightner by 
Mark Robbins 
0-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Fourth 
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Expert Testimony of Merrill 
Weight 
0-01-07 Filed: Motion in Limine to Exclude Loan and Escrow Agreements 
Purportedly Executed by Arimex 
Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO, 
0-01-07 Filed: Notice of Entry of Appearance of Counsel (James Lowrie) 
0-01-07 Filed: Joinder in Defendant Mark Robbin's Fourth Motion in 
Limine: Exclusion of Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight 
0-01-07 Filed: Motion in Limine to Exclude the Proposed Expert Report 
and Testimony of Ronald Haertel 
Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO, 
0-01-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Motion in Limine 
dinted: 04/30/08 13:30:22 Page 28 
\SE NUMBER 030917018 Miscellaneous 
Requesting Spoliation Sanctions for Lost or Destroyed Bank One 
Account Records and Bank One's Failure to Comply with Rule 
30(B) (6) 
Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO, 
D-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' First 
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Evidence of Other Lawsuits 
Involving Robbins 
D-01-07 Filed: Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exclude Cherokee and 
Walker and Certain Non-Parties from Apportionment of Fault 
Filed by: BODELL CONSTRUCTION CO, 
3-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Cherokee and Walker and Certain Non-Parties from 
Apportionment of Fault 
D-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to 
Exclude the Proposed Expert Report and Testimony of Ronald 
Haertel 
D-01-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude 
Loan and Escrow Agreements Purportedly Executed by Arimex 
D-01-07 Filed: Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in 
Support of Its Motion in Limine Requesting Spoliation sanctions 
for Lost or Destroyed Bank One Account Records and Bank One's 
Failure to Comply with Rule 30(B) (6) 
AfinfiR 
L-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant Mark Robbins' Sixth 
Motion in Limine: Exclusion of Evidence of Secondary 
Conspiracy 
2-07 Filed: Joint Submittal of Stipulated and Disputed Jury 
Instructions 
1-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Clerk: amberlw 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JOHN A BECKSTEAD 
JASON R HULL 
JAMES S JARDINE 
MATTHEW R LEWIS 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID W TUFTS 
Audio 
Tape Number: 8:35:20 Tape Count: 9:25:27 
HEARING 
TAPE: 8:35:20 COUNT: 9:25:2 
On record before the Court is Law and Motion. After hearing 
argument of counsel, the Court rules as stated on the record. Mr 
Beckstead is to prepare the order. All future hearing and trial 
dates are stricken. 
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Doug Owens and Andrew Dice also appear. 
3-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled. 
3-07 Filed: Joint Exhibit List 
2-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
2-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.0 0 
4-07 Filed: Judgment (Unsigned) 
4-07 Filed: Order Granting Summary Judgment (Unsigned) 
4-07 Filed: Verified Memorandum of Costs of Defendant mark H. 
Robbins 
9-07 Filed: Transcript of Motion hearing dated October 3, 2007, 
Carolyn Erickson, CCT 
(5-07 Filed order: Revised Order Granting Summary Judgment 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Signed November 05, 2 007 
>5-07 Case Disposition is Judgment 
Disposition Judge is JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
16-07 Filed: Verified Memorandum of Costs 
.4-07 Filed: Bodell Construction's Objection to Defendants' Verified 
Memoranda of Costs and Motion to Tax Costs 
.6-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 23.00 
.6-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 23.00 
Note: 40.00 cash tendered. 17 change given. 
>7-07 Filed: Bank One's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Tax Costs 
1-27-07 Filed: Defendant Mark Robbins' Response to Bodell Construction 
Company's Objection to Defendants' Verified Memoranda of Costs 
and Motion to Tax Costs 
1-30-07 Filed: Notice of Bond 
1-30-07 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
1-30-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 205.00 
1-30-07 APPEAL Payment Received: 205.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
1-3 0-07 Bond Account created Total Due: 3 0 0.00 
1-3 0-07 Bond Posted Payment Received: 3 00.00 
2-03-07 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
2-03-07 Note: Cert/Copy of Notice of Appeal and Notice of Bond 
forwarded to Utah Court of Appeals-Fee Paid 
2-06-07 Fee Account created Total Due:' 1.50 
2-06-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.50 
Note: 5.0 0 cash tendered. 3.5 change given. 
2-07-07 Filed: Reply in support of Bodell Construction's Objection to 
Defendants' Verified Memoranda of Costs and Motion to Tax Costs 
2-11-07 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Letter to Counsel- Notice of 
Appeal has been filed-20070951-SC 
2-11-07 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah-Order-Effective twenty days from 
Date of this Order-Case will Transfer to Utah Court of 
Appeals-2 0 070951-SC 
2-12-07 Filed: Request for Transcript 
2-12-07 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision Plaintiff's Motion to Tax 
Costs 
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>-2 8-07 Minute Entry - MINUTE ORDER 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
In view of the fact that an appeal in this matter is 
pending, the Court shall refrain from ruling on the issues of costs 
until the appeal is resolved. 
Dated this day of 
, 2 0 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
L-07-08 Filed: Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment hearing dated 
9-10-07, Carolyn Erickson, CCT 
L-07-08 Filed: Transcript of Hearing on Motions dated 7-27-07, Carolyn 
Erickson, CCT 
L-07-08 Filed: Transcript of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
hearing dated 4-6-07, Carolyn Erickson, CCT 
L-07-08 Filed: Transcript of Hearing on Motions dated 7-28-04, Carolyn 
Erickson, CCT 
L-07-08 Filed: Transcript of Hearing on Motions dated 3-1-04, Carolyn 
Erickson, CCT 
7-08 Issued: Notice of Filing Transcripts on Appeal, Carolyn 
Erickson, CCT 
Judge JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
1-08 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals - Letter to James S. Jardine -
This case has been assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
case number will remain the same with the exception that it 
will have a -CA after the number. - 20070951-CA 
3-08 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals - Letter to Carolyn Erickson -
Please notify the Court of Appeals withing five days as to the 
status of the transcript. - 20070951-CA 
8-08 Filed: Record Index 
8-08 Note: Cert/Copy of Record Index forwarded to Utah Court of 
Appeals 
2-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 40.50 
2-08 COPY FEE Payment Received: 40.50 
3-08 Note: Record checked out to attorney Matthew Lewis 
(801-323-3480): Files-15, Transcripts-8. 
ted: 04/30/08 13:30:23 Page 31 (last) 
Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate. 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate 
of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 
10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty or 
interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or 
obligations made before May 14, 1981. 
Amended by Chapter 79, 1989 General Session 
W E A L T H / M A N A G E M E N T 
August 22, 2000 
To: Whom it may concern _ JSS 
8ANKZS0NE 
Re: MadTrax Group, LLC 
Gentlemen. 
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members 
Mark Robbins and Marc Jenson (the "Members") will be depositing $165,000,000 into 
Bank One, Utah NA- The funding is coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax 
Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a 
Bahamian corporation. The sum of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest 
bearing account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members. 
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